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Abstract 
 
My dissertation presents two lines of research that examine motivation-cognition interactions. 
The first focuses on the effects of gain and loss incentive on attentional performance in young 
and older adults, examines which aspects of attention/cognitive control may be most sensitive to 
incentive manipulations, and takes steps towards elucidating the cognitive-motivational states 
and traits that may mediate those effects. When monetary incentives were offered throughout the 
experiments, they tended to have no effect or a small beneficial effect on the focused attention of 
young adults, and decreased young adults’ subjective reports of mind-wandering.  In contrast, 
older adults had worse performance and more mind-wandering under incentive, especially loss 
incentive.  Monetary incentives offered in alternating runs reduced the overall performance of 
both young and older adults compared to groups for which incentive was not offered at all, 
whereas within the alternating-run groups, performance was worse on the runs without incentive. 
Additional results from self-report measures suggest that for young adults, decreased 
performance under incentive may be the result of distraction.  In contrast, older adults were more 
intrinsically motivated, and decreases in motivation under external incentive may underlie their 
reduced performance.  In short, these results demonstrate that incentives may sometimes 
paradoxically reduce, rather than increase, performance, and that the direction and underlying 
mechanisms of incentive effects are influenced by factors including age (young vs old) and 
incentive structure (between- or within-subject manipulation).   
 xiv
The second line of research investigates how outcome probability and valence may 
influence learning as well as subsequent explicit memory. Participants first learned to associate 
scenes with wins or losses that occurred at high or low probability, with probability thought to 
influence the “motivational salience” of the scene. The task objective was to maximize the 
reward (points or points and money) earned in each trial, and the optimal choices are the high 
probability win scene and the low probability loss scene. Contrary to the common assumption 
that win and loss outcome associations are learned equally, win associations were learned better 
than loss associations, suggesting an advantage for learning outcomes with a positive valence. A 
subsequent recognition task assessed explicit knowledge of the learned value associations. 
Regardless of learning level or incentive conditions, memory for the association between a scene 
and its valence and motivational salience was superior for scenes that had previously been the 
optimal choice (high probability win and low probability loss).  However. accurate recognition 
was significantly better for optimal win scenes than optimal loss scenes. These findings indicate 
that learning to select the optimal choice is dissociable from explicit knowledge about the 
outcome contingencies, especially for loss and low probability outcomes.  Moreover, 
motivational salience is represented differentially in explicit memory for win and loss outcomes.  
Together, this research examines several common assumptions about incentives and 
motivation in attention, learning, and memory in previous research studies, and demonstrates that 
the effects are more complex than currently realized. The discussion considers the implications 
for understanding the mechanisms underlying incentive effects on different types of cognition, as 
well as the effects of incentive in everyday life. 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
 
What is motivation? 
The Oxford Dictionary defines motivation as “a reason or reasons for acting or behaving 
in a particular way (‘motivation,’ 2018).” Motivation is a common word in everyday life. In 
research contexts, however, motivation is not a unified concept and can have different meanings. 
The research on motivation in psychology and neuroscience has a long history. However, 
different areas in these disciplines have distinct operationalized definitions and use a wide 
variety of research paradigms to study motivation (Braver et al., 2014). These different concepts 
have led to a diverse body of theories in motivation on human and animal behaviors.  
The major historical divergence in the study of motivation is among behavioral 
neuroscience, social/personality/educational psychology, and cognitive psychology/cognitive 
neuroscience. In behavioral neuroscience, motivation is an evolving concept. Historically, the 
study of motivation focused on homeostasis and drives (Berridge, 2004). In the context of 
behavioral neuroscience, homeostasis in this context refers to an internal system using a setpoint 
to maintain a stable state. Any deviation in the current physiological state from this internal 
setpoint results in an error and activates the homeostasis system to perform appropriate responses 
(Hull, 1943). While many theories developed based on homeostasis and drive, behavioral 
neuroscience has moved from simple homeostatic drives to study the complex of emotional and 
cognitive processes typically thought of as “real motivation” that leads to flexible instrumental 
behaviors (Teitelbaum, 1977). Concepts of incentive value and incentive learning developed in 
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to different theories about incentive motivation (Berridge, 2004). Incentive value refers to the 
probability of an outcome associated with a particular behavior. Experimental studies in this 
tradition investigate how value is learned; for example, Paradigms of Pavlovian conditioning and 
instrumental learning are often used to study the behavioral and neural responses of an agent 
(e.g. a rat) to a stimulus or an action with previously learned outcomes. A brief review of 
different systems for value learning is provided in Chapter IV.   
Social, personality, educational psychology theories of motivation often focus on how 
motivation functions and interacts with different levels of personal, social and organizational 
contexts (Ryan, 2012). Braver and colleagues (2014) argue that goals are the fundamental 
conceptualization of motivation in this field. Goals can be defined as the representation of 
specific aims that guides behavior (Elliot & Fryer, 2008). Here, goals can vary across different 
domains, such as education, social relations, sport, and work. Research studies on these goal 
domains, contexts and functions has generated rich and diverse frameworks in this field. For 
example, Achievement Goal Theory is concerned with learning and performance, focusing on 
the interplay between mastery goals and performance goals with regard to outcome (see review 
by Murayama et al., 2012). This theory originated from studies on children’s learning behaviors 
(Elliot, 2005). There are also other theories that were developed in the field and applied to 
various domains. One example is Self-Determination Theory (SDT, Deci & Ryan, 2012), which 
developed from studies comparing intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. This theory centers on the 
extent to which behaviors are autonomous (i.e. behaviors that are initiated for oneself) vs 
controlled (behaviors that are pressured and influenced by external factors). The STD has been 
applied in domains such as health behaviors, organizational studies, and sport and exercise 
(Ryan, 2012). In the fields of social, personality, and educational psychology, self-report 
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methodology is one prominent way of studying motivation (Fulmer & Frijters, 2009). In recent 
years, experimental methods have also developed to measure implicit or unconscious motivation, 
such as using priming and implicit rating task (Thrash et al., 2012)  
Cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists study the process and mechanism of 
motivation and how it affects behaviors and cognition (Kringelbach & Berridge, 2016). In these 
fields, experimental manipulations often use extrinsic incentives (i.e. money). A very common 
paradigm is the monetary incentive delay (MID) task (Knutson et al., 2000; Lutz & Widmer, 
2014), in which a cue indicates the amount of money that can be earned/lost for 
successful/failure performance before a subject performs a trial. The performance difference 
between incentivized and non-incentivized conditions or trials is viewed as an index of the effect 
of motivation. With the development of neuroimaging techniques, cognitive neuroscientists have 
started to examine the neural correlates of motivation and how it may influence different 
cognitive processes.  
This brief review demonstrates differences in how motivation is conceptualized and 
operationally defined in different fields or even within one field. The division in different 
subfields has advanced our understanding of distinct aspects of motivation. It is important to 
point out that these distinctions also reflect the complex and rich nature of motivational states 
and behaviors. However, while each subfield has developed and progressed within their own 
area, differences in definition of motivation and in research methodologies pose challenges for 
interdisciplinary communications and collaborations. Braver and colleagues (2014) summarized 
a number of limitations in different subfields of motivation research. For example, behavioral 
neuroscience primarily studies the effect of motivation on a limited behavioral repertoire and 
rarely studies higher cognitive processing. On the other hand, cognitive psychology and 
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cognitive neuroscience are rigorous in experimental control but hardly considers complex 
individual factors that may affect motivation.  
The current dissertation examines the interaction between cognition and motivation. 
Experiments presented in this dissertation aim to address some of the abovementioned 
shortcomings in hopes of developing a more collaborative approach to the study of motivation. 
In recent decades, researchers have made efforts to facilitate collaborative investigations across 
areas so that areas of research on motivation will no longer be studied in isolation. Human 
research has started using paradigms from animal learning and behavioral neuroscience to 
examine effects of learned value information processing. Social and educational psychologists 
use neural imaging tools to study how the effects of motivation in social and educational 
contexts may influence cognition and the neural mechanisms behind them. Meanwhile, cognitive 
psychologists and neuroscientists have also extended their research scope to consider the 
influence of individual differences and social contexts on motivation and cognitive processes.  
Since the definition of a concept determines the scope of research, I will define 
motivation based on consistency across fields (Braver, 2014). By motivation, I refer to the 
processes by which goal-directed behaviors are maintained and sustained, maximizing positive 
outcomes and minimizing negative outcomes (Young, 1959; Elliot & Covington, 2001). 
Importantly, there are two levels of motivation: motivational orientation and motivational state. 
The former is a more trait-like level of motivation that is relatively stable. The latter is a more 
state-like level of motivation that constantly changes as a result of dynamic interactions with the 
environment. When discussing motivation in a life-span and aging context, I refer to the trait-like 
level of motivation. For experimental manipulations, the state-like is often operationally defined 
in specific experiments.  
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Dissertation Overview  
 In this dissertation, I present two lines of research. Chapters II and III focus on the effects 
of gain and loss incentive on young and older adults. Chapter IV examines the effects of 
outcome valence and motivational salience on learning and source recognition. Although the 
convergence of the two lines of research may not be immediate and apparent, they are both 
empirical investigation of motivation-cognition interactions, addressing some of the important 
issues in the field. These two lines of research share two relevant aspects: 1) First, they research 
use monetary incentives as manipulation, allowing us to test the effects of incentive on 
performance in different cognitive domains; second, they manipulate valence, allowing us to 
gain more insights into the effects of gain and loss processing.    
In the rest of this chapter, I provide a brief review of topics in motivation research that 
are relevant to my dissertation. Within each empirical chapter, an embedded introduction further 
motivates each set of the experiment. Table 1 provides an outline of topics addressed in each 
chapter. Chapters II and Chapter III investigate the effects of monetary incentives on young and 
older adults. To address the ecological-validity issues of using trial-by-trial incentive 
manipulation, both chapters use a task-wise incentive manipulation, mirroring real-life situations 
in which incentives are often seamless and without a clear cue. While Chapter II uses a between-
subject manipulation, Chapter III uses a mixed design to explore temporally specific and general 
context effects. Chapter IV examines the effects of outcome valence and outcome probability on 
learning. The learned association is also assessed through a source recognition task.  Chapter V 
presents a brief summary of the findings, discusses real-world applications, and considers future 
directions for research and for potentially bridging these two research lines.  
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Table I-1 Outline of studies and topics addressed in each chapter. 
Aim Chapter Topics Addressed 
 Chapter I: Introduction  
Aim1: Effects of Gain and Loss Incentive on Young and Older Adults 
 Chapter II Age and Motivation 
 Chapter III Age and Motivation, Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation 
Aim 2: Effect of Outcome Valence and Motivational Salience on Learning Recognition 
 Chapter IV Value and Reward 
 Chapter V: Summary  
 
   
Motivational Changes in Aging 
A large body of research has documented the neurocognitive changes in old age (Park & 
Reuter-Lorenz, 2009). However, these age-related changes in neural and cognitive functions may 
not always explain age-related performance differences (Braver, 2014).  In recent years, how 
motivation modulates cognitive processing in old age has gained considerable attention in 
research. To investigate motivation-cognition interactions in old age, it is also important to 
understand age differences in motivation and their potential impact on cognitive processes.  
Two accounts have been proposed to explain the change of motivational priorities in old 
age. One perspective argues that the motivational shift in old age is a self-regulatory strategy to 
adapt to environmental and experiential changes that occur with aging. A prominent theory in 
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this account is the socioemotional selectivity theory (SST; Carstensen, 1992; 1999). According 
to SST, when one’s future lifetime is perceived to be limited, emotionally meaningful goals are 
prioritized over future-oriented goals, such as growth and acquiring new experience. The SST 
argues that this motivational shift in aging is adaptive. While older adults change goal priority as 
a function of limited future time, their preference of processing positive information over 
negative information helps them not only maintain positive affect, but also shapes and selects the 
environment they interact with. The preference for positive over negative information in old age 
is manifested in cognitive processing. The pattern that older adults, compared to younger adults, 
remember and pay attention to positive over negative information is referred as the “positivity 
effect” (Mather & Carstensen, 2005; Reed et al., 2014).  
An alternative perspective focuses on age-related declines and proposes that the declines 
in physical and neurocognitive functions in old age lead to shifting motivational goals. For 
example, Cacioppo and colleagues (2011) have proposed an aging-brain model that suggested 
the positivity effect is an effect of reduced responsiveness to negative stimuli as a consequence 
of age-related amygdala degeneration. The selection, optimization, and compensation (SOC; 
Baltes, 1997; Freund & Baltes, 2000) proposed that the balance of maximizing gain (growth) and 
minimizing loss across lifespan is the key to successful development. With decreasing resources 
in old age, individuals shift away from activities associated with growth and emphasized 
maintenance and loss prevention.   
Chapter II and Chapter III in my dissertation use an attentional task in healthy young and 
older adults to examine how monetary incentives affect their attentional performance. Relevant 
to motivational changes in aging, the monetary incentive in the two studies is manipulated in 
gain, loss, and control conditions. These two chapters test predictions regarding potential 
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differences in how young and older adults respond to positive vs. negative incentive information.  
Findings from these studies contribute to our understanding on what components of performance 
are affected and offer insights on why they are affected. 
 
Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation 
Research on motivation in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience has mostly 
used incentives by providing participants performance-based monetary rewards. Although it is 
commonly assumed that incentives, in this case monetary incentives, have beneficial effects on 
performance, in reality findings are mixed. For example, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) reviewed 
74 studies with incentive manipulations that vary levels of reward. They found that monetary 
incentives did not always improve performance and sometimes even decrease performance. They 
argued that the effects of the incentive depend on several factors, including task difficulty, match 
with subject’s skill, and the magnitude of the reward. In the studies researchers reviewed, the 
most common result was null effect of monetary incentive (or not measurable).  Another study 
conducted by Bonner and colleagues (2000) found that about half of the experiments included in 
their analysis showed an enhancement effect of monetary incentives; the other half of showed 
null effects or even detrimental effects. They noted that the complexity of the task was 
negatively correlated with the enhancement effects of monetary incentives.  
One of the major theories developed from behavioral works is self-determination theory 
(SDT; Deci & Ryan 1985; 2012). This theory draws a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation. Intrinsically motivated activities are inherently satisfying whereas extrinsic 
motivated activities are driven by external rewards or incentives (e.g. food or money). Since 
extrinsic rewards are provided by external sources, these rewards may undermine one’s self-
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determination and intrinsic motivation. This theory is often used to explain findings on the 
negative effects of monetary incentives, termed the “undermining effect” (Deci et al., 1999, Hidi, 
2016).  
As mentioned earlier, most cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience studies 
exclusively have used extrinsic incentives, paying little attention to intrinsic motivation. My 
dissertation addresses this issue by including self-reported measures of intrinsic motivation in 
Chapter III. In addition to use performance index (difference between incentivized performance 
and non-incentivized performance), we also included self-reported measures to assess 
participants’ subjective motivation. Similar to most of the cognitive psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience studies, experiments in Chapter II and III use monetary incentives to manipulate 
extrinsic motivation. Most previous studies in this domain use trial-by-trail incentive cues to 
indicate prospect of the reward. However, in real-life situation, incentives are often more 
seamless and applied to the entire situation. We therefore sought to emulate this latter situation 
by using a task-wise, between-subjects manipulation of incentive in Chapter II. Chapter III 
combines this between-subjects manipulation with a within-subjects (alternating runs) 
manipulation to demonstrate that these two different structures for manipulating incentive can 
have very different – and indeed opposite – effects.   
Reward and Value 
 Motivation is closely related to reward because it is a process oriented toward a prospect 
of a reward (Botvinck & Braver, 2015). In many research contexts, reward and value are used 
interchangeably. In my dissertation, value refers to the amount of reward one expects to obtain 
from an action. In Chapter IV, value learning refers to the learning process of forming an action-
outcome representation in order to obtain and make prediction about a reward. This type of 
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learning has been referred to by various labels in different areas of psychology and neuroscience, 
such as value-based decision making, reward learning, and reinforcement learning. This area of 
research has strong connections with behavioral neuroscience research in animal learning. The 
essence of value learning is to associate an otherwise neutral stimulus with a value, allowing an 
agent to optimize behavior by learning to predict the outcomes of actions. Learning to associate 
value with new stimuli is essential to functioning flexibly and adaptively in complex 
environment.  
 Research on value learning has been rapidly growing in the past decade. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, the study of motivation in behavioral neuroscience often has focused on a 
limited set of behaviors and is constrained in the degree to which it can investigate how 
motivation influences higher cognitive processing. Research on reward, value, and value learning 
has extended our insight into how learned value influences cognitive processes. There are two 
main research approaches in this area. One focuses on investigating the neural mechanisms of 
value signals in the brain. This approach often uses neuroimaging tools such as fmri to study 
value learning. Findings from this approach have been very fruitful (see a review by O’Doherty, 
Cockburn, & Pauli, 2017). The other is a two-pronged approach: Stimuli from a prior value 
learning or value decision-making task are incorporated in a subsequent follow-up or secondary 
task to examine the consequences of prior learning.  These studies typically both assume that 
participants have acquired value associations during the initial learning task and make inferences 
about what was learned based on the performance of the secondary task. Researchers have used 
the second approach to study how learned value influenced different cognitive processes, such as 
perceptual processing (O’Brien & Raymond, 2012), attention (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 
2011; Della Libera, & Chelazzi, 2009; Raymond and O’Brien, 2009), motor control (Painter, 
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Kritikos, & Raymond, 2013), working memory (Thomas, FitzGibbon, & Raymond, 2016) and 
associative memory (Aberg, Müller, & Schwartz, 2017). Together, these investigations provide 
new insights into the neural mechanism of how value is represented in the brain and how value 
may influence high cognitive processing.   
 Chapter IV uses a similar two-pronged approach. However, the secondary task is 
specifically designed to assess participants’ explicit knowledge of the learned associations. 
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Chapter II. The Effect of Gain vs. Loss Incentive on Different Types of Attention in 
Young and Older Adults 
 
 
Abstract 
It seems intuitive that receiving money for good performance or losing money for poor 
performance would increase attention and performance - but is this true across age groups and 
different aspects of attention?  Previous studies have suggested that older adults are insensitive to 
loss, but this pattern is discrepant with workplace studies and may be the outcome of trial and 
incentive structures that facilitate stimulus-driven attention. We tested younger and older adults 
in a task that assesses three aspects of attentional control (focusing attention, sustaining attention, 
resisting distraction) under no-incentive, gain-incentive, or loss-incentive conditions.  Incentive 
tended to improve the focused attention of young adults and decreased their subjective reports of 
mind-wandering.  In contrast, older adults had worse performance and more mind-wandering 
under incentive, especially the loss condition.  These deleterious effects were statistically 
eliminated by controlling for mind-wandering, suggesting that loss incentives may paradoxically 
decrease motivation and focus in older adults. 
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Introduction 
We have tried to make this paper as interesting as possible, but at some point, your 
attention will wander.  Would your focus improve if by correctly answering questions about the 
paper’s contents, you could earn up to $20?  What if we gave you $20 now, but for every 
question you got wrong, we took some money back? 
Incentives are often used to improve attention and performance in laboratory experiments 
and everyday life, presumably by increasing motivation.  Motivation-cognition interactions have 
become a topic of intense scientific interest, with the publication rate on this topic nearly 
doubling over the past decade.  Reviewing this literature, Botvinick and Braver (2015) remarked, 
“the most fundamental set of phenomena linking control with motivation involves effects of 
incentives… The most common observation….introduction or enlargement of performance-
contingent rewards or punishments results in improvements in task performance, specifically 
attributable to enhanced executive control.”  (pg. 87) This observation seems intuitive - but does 
it hold true across populations and different aspects of control?  We investigate these questions 
by comparing young and older adults’ response to monetary incentives in a task that allows 
simultaneous assessment of multiple aspects of controlled attention. 
Most studies of age differences in incentive-cognition effects have examined 
reinforcement learning and decision-making, rather than attention.  The patterns differ for 
anticipation and response versus learning the value of different choices (see review by Samanez-
Larkin & Knutson, 2015).  Older adults are similar to young adults in their arousal ratings and 
neural responses to anticipated gains, actual gains, and actual losses, but have reduced arousal 
and neural responses to anticipated losses.  In contrast, when learning and updating 
representations of the values associated with different decisions, older adults are slower and 
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more error-prone, regardless of valence (gain or loss).  It is not clear whether these findings are 
due to differences in cognitive control, but they suggest that age differences in incentive 
processing may interact with valence and the type of cognitive process. 
In contrast to the established literature on age-incentive interactions in learning and 
memory, studies of these effects on attention and online processing are sparse and somewhat 
inconsistent, potentially due to the disparate incentive structures and types of attention tested 
across studies.  For example, older adults have been found to be both more and less sensitive to 
incentive cues and their valence compared to young adults (e.g., Di Rosa et al., 2015; 
Houvenaghel et al., 2016; Schmitt, Ferdinand, & Kray, 2015; Pachur et al., 2017; Touron and 
Hertzog, 2009, Westbrook et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2017). Similar to the learning domain, 
when age differences are found, older adults usually have lower responsivity (less difference 
compared to a no-incentive baseline) to loss.  This pattern is often explained by assuming that 
older adults minimize attention and emotional responsivity to negative information, in 
accordance with the “positivity effect” – an age-related tendency to enhance attention and 
memory for positive information, and reduce it for negative information (Mather et al., 2005).   
The research assistants in many aging labs would find that explanation quite surprising.  
Most of them would testify that in their experience, older adults are much more motivated than 
young adults to perform well on cognitive tasks and more upset by errors and negative feedback. 
Self-report data in some mind-wandering studies also indicate that older adults are more 
motivated than young adults to stay focused on the task and perform well (e.g., Frank, Nara, 
Zavagnin, Touron, & Kane, 2015).  Likewise, Lumosity users who complete at least 25 sessions 
are older than those who do not (Sternberg et al., 2013), indicating a strong motivation to 
maintain cognitive performance.  The value older adults place on maintaining cognition may 
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make them more, rather than less, responsive to negative information when it concerns their own 
performance rather than external stimuli (words, pictures, events).  Ironically, this increased 
responsivity may cause them to lose motivation and disengage from the task, leading to further 
errors (Charles, 2010; Hess, 2014; Zacher et al., 2016).  This pattern is seen in the workplace, 
where older adults are more upset by and less likely to correct errors (Birdi & Zapf, 1997).   
The contradictions between workplace and laboratory studies may be due to differences 
in incentive structure and type of attentional demand.  In the workplace and other real-world 
situations (reading this paper, writing your own, driving without getting lost or in an accident), 
the incentive often applies to the entire situation, and the environment does not supply many cues 
to stimulus-driven, reactive attention.  This places heavy demands on goal-driven, self-directed 
attentional focus.  In contrast many laboratory attention tasks use incentive cues on every trial, 
targets that are perceptually different from nontargets, frequent probes, and demands for speeded 
responses, all of which may provide bottom-up, stimulus-driven support to attention, increase 
engagement in the task, and reduce mind-wandering (Ralph et al., 2016; Wilson et al., 2016).  
Older adults are more reliant on bottom-up stimulus cues, environmental support for attention, 
and reactive responses to probes (Craik & Byrd, 1982; Lindenberger & Mayr, 2014; Paxton et 
al., 2008).  These factors may have reduced the sensitivity of previous studies to incentive effects 
in older adults.   
To create a more ecologically-valid test, we used the same incentive condition across the 
entire session, and a task in which target detection depends heavily on goal-directed attention 
and for which misses have been associated with neural and self-report measures of disengaged 
attention and mind-wandering.  This task also assesses the degree to which attention is sustained 
over time and resistant to external distractors, but based on previous research those measures 
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were not expected to be as closely related to mind-wandering (Berry, Demeter et al., 2014; 
Berry, Li, et al., 2014) or sensitive to incentive (e.g., Estermann et al., 2014; Hickey et al., 2010).  
Our results suggest that “paying attention” – especially penalizing poor attention – may decrease 
attentional focus and increase mind-wandering in older adults. 
 
Methods 
All methods, materials, and procedures were approved by the University of Michigan 
Institutional Review Board.   
Participants 
 Ninety-six young adult and 96 older adult participants were included in the final analysis.  
An a priori power analysis conducted in G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul et al., 2007) indicated that a total 
sample size of n = 158 (26 subjects per group) would be required to detect the critical Age X 
Incentive interaction at a moderate effect size; we increased this to n = 32 per group (total n = 
192) based on the results of our pilot study (see Supplemental Materials). 
Young adults (60 female, mean age = 20.04 years, range 18-25) were students recruited from the 
University of Michigan.  Older adults (57 female, mean age = 69.88, range 60-83) were recruited 
from the Ann Arbor community.  All participants received $10 per hour for their participation.  
Participants in each age group were randomly assigned to one of three incentive conditions:  
control (no performance incentive), gain condition (potential to earn up to $20 reward for good 
performance) and loss condition (start with $20, lose 20 cents per error).   Participants were 
screened to ensure physical and psychological health with no history of anxiety, depression, 
ADHD, or head injury, and no use of medications that affect cognition.  Consistent with usual 
procedures in our lab, the Extended Range Vocabulary Test Version 3 (ERVT; Educational 
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Testing Service, 1976) was used as a screen for participants who might not understand the 
instructions or were generally unmotivated; a minimum score of 9 out of a possible 48 was 
required.  Data from individuals with overall very poor performance on the computer task (hit 
rate below 40% during the first minute of the No Distractor condition, or false alarms larger than 
3 standard deviations above the mean) indicating a failure to understand or engage in the task 
were excluded. For older adults, a  Mini Mental State Examination score (MMSE; Cockrell & 
Folstein, 1988) of 27 or greater was required (see Table 1 for demographic information; 
Supplemental Materials Table 6 for exclusions by criterion).  
 
Table II-1 Demographic information and self-reported measures 
Demographic information and self-reported difficulties with attentional control in everyday life 
(Poor Attentional Control scale; PAC; see text for details). 
  Young 
Control       
(n = 32) 
Young 
Gain       
(n = 32) 
Young 
Loss       
(n = 32) 
Old 
Control       
(n = 32) 
Old   
Gain       
(n = 32) 
Old  
Loss       
(n = 32) 
Age     
 mean 20.09 19.66 20.38 70.38 68.22 71.03 
 SD 1.30 1.73 1.38 5.91 5.48 7.42 
Years of Education       
 mean 14.56 14.56 14.86 17.12 17.88 16.73 
 SD 1.19 1.66 1.29 2.95 2.04 2.28 
ERVT       
 mean 19.47 21.37 21.71 31.48 34.59 31.50 
 SD 6.21 6.30 6.35 7.07 5.85 10.88 
PAC Mind-
Wandering 
      
 mean 14.38 14.09 14.41 12.34 12.75 11.66 
 SD 4.03 3.71 3.46 2.48 2.38 3.08 
PAC Boredom       
 mean 13.34 12.97 13.81 11.03 11.16 11.22 
 SD 3.46 3.96 3.37 3.15 2.49 2.70 
PAC Distractibility       
 mean 15.63      14.53 14.84 13.59 13.28 13.34 
 SD 4.02 3.88 3.76 4.41 3.62 3.29 
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Materials 
Continuous Temporal Expectancy Task (CTET) with Video Distractor 
 See Figure 1 for an illustration of the task and experimental manipulation. As described 
by O’Connell and colleagues (2009), the CTET was designed to assess lapses of sustained 
attention and the decline of attentional performance across time, and different EEG signatures 
are associated with short-term lapses of attention (immediately before a missed target) versus 
longer-term declines of attention over time.  Our lab has modified the CTET to include a video 
distractor condition (Berry, Li, et al., 2014) and likewise demonstrated dissociations between the 
different aspects of attention measured by the task.  Of particular relevance to the present study, 
overall target detection performance is affected by modality manipulations that influence the 
degree to which detection depends on goal- versus stimulus-driven attention and correlates with 
self-reported difficulties keeping attention focused (mind-wandering), whereas vulnerability to 
distraction is affected by genetic and pathological conditions affecting the cholinergic system 
and correlates with self-reported vulnerability to distraction in everyday life (Berry, Demeter et 
al., 2014;  Berry, Lin, et al. 2014, Kim et al., submitted). 
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Figure II-1 Continuous temporal expectancy task (CTET) with distraction 
a. Participants viewed a grid that typically rotated every 800 ms (90, 180, or 270° rotation, randomly 
intermixed) and were to press the spacebar in response to the longer-duration target (1070ms).  b. The 
distractor manipulation was implemented using a laptop computer oriented 32° to the left of the task 
computer, and 65 cm from the participant.  In the No Distractor condition, the laptop was silent and 
displayed a grey screen.  In the Distractor condition, the laptop played a series of 30 second video clips, 
including the audio component. 
 
 
The main task (CTET) was presented on a Dell PC computer using E-prime version 2.0.8.90 
(Psychology Software tools; http://www.pstnet.com/eprime.cfm).  During the task, a black and 
white grid with squares divided diagonally into halves rotated randomly at 90, 180, or 270 
degrees at a standard interval of 800 ms, with occasional longer target intervals of 1070 ms.  
(Figure 1).  Participants were instructed to monitor the duration of rotations and press the space 
bar when they detected the target (longer duration rotation).  Before beginning the experiment, 
participants were given 6 practice runs (3 targets each).  To ensure that participants understood 
the task, the duration difference between standard trials and target trials was exaggerated during 
the first practice (standard: 800msec; target: 1600).  The duration difference for the remaining 5 
practice runs was identical to testing runs.  Participants had to achieve 100% on at least one of 
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these 5 practice runs in order to proceed to the experiment.  The experiment had 10 testing runs 
(4 min each) with 24 targets per run.  Stimuli were presented in a pseudo-randomly intermixed 
fashion, such that the number of standard trials between two targets ranged from 7 to 17 trials 
(with an average of 10 standard trials intervening between targets).  A correct response (hit) was 
recorded if participants responded within 2.46s following the target offset.  Responses outside 
this time window were coded as false alarms.  At the end of each run, participants were given 
feedback on their performance and took a one-minute break.   
The distractor manipulation created by our lab was implemented on a laptop computer to the 
left of the main task computer.  During No Distractor runs, the laptop presented a grey screen 
and remained silent.  During Distractor runs, the laptop played a series of 30-second video clips 
with audio.  Clips were screened to ensure that they did not contain music or other strong 
rhythmic components that could influence timing performance.  For each participant, half of the 
runs were in the No Distractor condition, and half were in the Distractor condition, interleaved.  
Half of the participants in each Age X Incentive group started with a No Distractor run, the other 
half with a Distractor run.  No Distractor and Distractor runs alternated, and their order was 
counterbalanced across participants.   
For participants in the incentive conditions, the task was identical with the addition of a 
monetary incentive, which participants were informed about after they completed the practice.  
In the gain condition, participants were told that they could earn up to a $20 bonus based on task 
performance, but that 20 cents would be deducted from this amount for each error (either missing 
a target or making a false alarm).  Reward earned during the trial was placed on the table after 
the feedback screen was displayed.  The instructions for the loss procedure were the same, with 
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the exception that in this case twenty dollars were placed in front of the participant at the 
beginning of the task, and the amount was reduced as needed at the end of each run. 
 
Questionnaires 
 Poor Attentional Control (PAC) scale.  Participants rated 36 statements about cognition 
and attention in everyday life from the Imaginal Processes Inventory (Singer & Antrobus, 1970) 
as to how true each statement was of them (1 = not all true of me; 5 = very true of me).  As in 
previous papers from our group (Berry, Demeter, et al., 2014; Berry, Li, et al., 2014; Kim et al., 
2017, submitted), final analyses focused on the 15 items from the mind-wandering, boredom, 
and distractibility subscales, which make up the Poor Attentional Control (PAC) scale identified 
in a factor analysis (Huba, Singer, Aneshensel, & Antrobus, 1982).  This scale was used as the 
trait measure of attentional function in everyday life, and thus was administered before 
participants completed the computer task.  
 Surprise quiz and post-experiment questionnaire.  After the computer task, participants 
were given a quiz consisting of 15 multiple-choice questions to test their memory of the 
distractor video content, and a 5 question post-experiment questionnaire.  The post-experiment 
questionnaire asked participants to rate their level of mind-wandering, boredom, and 
distractibility during the task based on a scale from 1 to 5.  The questions were created with 
similar form and content to items from the PAC.  As in our prior work (Berry, Demeter, et al., 
2014; Berry, Li, et al., 2014), question 4 (‘I had difficulty in keeping my attention focused on 
this long tedious task’) was used as a state measure of mind-wandering; question 3 (‘I was easily 
bored during this task.’) measured boredom; and question 5 (‘No matter how hard I tried to 
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concentrate, I felt easily distracted by the video playing.’) measured distractibility.  These 
questions were used as state attention measures; that is, attention during the task.   
Analysis 
 Analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS version 24.  As in prior work, (Berry, 
Demeter, et al., 2014; Berry, Li, et al., 2014; O'Connell et al., 2009), average minute-by-minute 
hit rates (correct detections of target) were the primary dependent variable for the CTET.  
Analyses of signal detection measures yielded similar results. (See Supplemental Materials Table 
1).   Likewise replicating previous studies by our lab and others, there were no “run” effects 
(increasing or decreasing performance across the session); analyses below therefore report the 
session average for each condition.  To examine interactions between Age Group and the 
different experimental factors, data were analyzed in a mixed-design ANOVA with the between-
subject factors Age Group (young, old), and Incentive (Control, Gain, Loss) and the within-
subject factors Time (minute 1, 2, 3, and 4) and Distractor Condition (No distractor, Distractor), 
with follow-up ANOVA and two-sided Dunnett’s t-tests (contrasting each incentive condition 
with the control condition; note that this test in SPSS provides the p values and confidence 
intervals (CI) but not the t value per se)  used to contrast conditions within each age group.  For 
the main effect of Time and interactions involving this factor, reported results are from the linear 
trend analyses.  For analyses including within-subjects factors, the Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction was applied when sphericity was violated, and corrected degrees of freedom (rounded 
to the nearest integer for easier reading), p, and F values are reported below.  Effect sizes for 
repeated measures were determined using generalized eta squared (2G  , Olejnik & Algina, 
2003).  This calculation gives smaller numbers than the  partial eta squared that is often reported, 
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but is preferred as it reduces error when comparing across studies (Bakeman, 2005; Fritz, Morris, 
& Richler, 2012).   
 For the questionnaire measures of attention (PAC score and corresponding post-
experiment questions), a multivariate test was used with Age and Incentive as fixed factors, and 
the three dimensions (mind-wandering, boredom, distraction) as the dependent variables.  
Performance on the post-experiment quiz was analyzed using a univariate ANOVA with Age 
and Incentive as the fixed factors.  As for the CTET, follow-up analyses were conducted within 
each age group with incentive conditions contrasted against the control condition using 
Dunnett’s t-test. 
 
Results 
Negative Incentive Reduces Attentional Focus in Older Adults 
 Statistical analyses reported here focus on effects involving the incentive manipulation; 
full ANOVA results for the CTET are reported in Supplemental Materials Table 2.  We 
replicated standard effects of time-on-task declines, reduced performance under distraction, and 
a greater impact of distraction on older adults than young adults. 
 The critical results are illustrated in Figure 2.  The incentive conditions numerically 
improved the performance and subjective attention of young adults, especially in the gain 
condition, but reduced the performance and subjective attention of older adults, especially in the 
loss condition.  As described above, for each age group we conducted a follow-up ANOVA with 
the between-subjects factor Incentive and the within-subjects factors Distraction and Time, and 
used post-hoc two-sided Dunnett’s t-tests to compare the control condition to each incentive 
condition.  For young adults, there were no main effects or interactions with the Incentive 
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condition, all p > .250; likewise the post-hoc tests did not show significant differences between 
the control group and either incentive group, both p > .250.  In contrast, for the older adults, the 
main effect of Incentive was marginal, F(2, 93) = 2.95, p = .057, 2G = .051, with the Dunnett’s 
t-test showing that performance in the gain condition was numerically but not statistically lower 
than the control condition (p > .250, CI = -.121 - .059), whereas performance in the loss 
condition was significantly worse than performance in the control condition (p = .036, CI = -.185 
- -.005).  This indicates that the marginal status of the main effect in the overall ANOVA is 
mostly like due to both the gain and loss conditions being numerically lower than the control 
condition (and thus both contributing to the grand mean).  (See Supplemental Materials for 
similar effects of the loss incentive in our pilot dataset.) 
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Figure II-2 Loss incentive reduces the performance of older adults.   
Different colors (control = black, green = gain, red = loss) and shades (dark = young adults, light = older 
adults) are used to highlight the different conditions.  Error bars represent confidence intervals (between-
subjects; note that the distraction manipulation is within-subjects).  Results are collapsed across the Time 
factor for clarity; see Table 1 in Supplemental Materials for those numbers.  While incentive tended to 
improve the performance of young adults, especially in the gain condition, it reduced the performance of 
older adults, especially in the loss condition. 
 
 
Positive incentive increases subjective attention for young adults, whereas negative incentive 
decreases subjective attention for older adults 
 The PAC measures served as a “trait” measure of subjective attention in everyday life.  
Replicating typical findings (Giambra, 1993; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Maillet & Schacter, 2016), 
older adults reported lower rates of mind-wandering, boredom, and distraction in everyday life 
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than did young adults, all F > 8.20, p < .001, 2G  > .042.  There were no pre-existing differences 
between the Incentive groups or Age X Incentive interactions on any of these measures, all F < 
1.  
 The post-experiment questionnaire measures asked participants about their mind-
wandering, boredom, and distraction during the task.  In contrast to the lack of differences 
between the incentive groups for the “trait” (PAC) measures reported above, incentive had 
opposite effects on young and older adults’ experience during the task itself (Age X Incentive 
interactions for mind-wandering, F(2, 186) = 3.88, p = .022, 2G  =.040; boredom, F(2, 186) = 
4.42, p = .013, 2G  =.045; distraction, F(2, 186) = 2.99, p = .052, 2G  =.031).  As seen in Figure 3, 
the results, especially for the mind-wandering measure, generally replicated the pattern seen for 
target detection in the CTET.  For young adults, the incentive conditions tended to decrease 
mind-wandering and boredom during the task, with effects reaching statistical significance for 
the gain condition (mind-wandering:  mean difference = -.844, p = .006, CI = -1.463 - -0.224; 
boredom: mean difference = -.938, p = .009, CI: -1.67 - - 0.210).  Older adults showed the 
opposite pattern, and in particular an increase in mind-wandering in the loss condition (mean 
difference .656, p = .044, CI = .016 – 1.296). Incentive did not affect the degree to which 
participants reported being distracted by the video for either group, suggesting that manipulating 
incentives primarily affected task focus and engagement, rather than impacting all executive-
control functions (including distractibility) equally.  The surprise quiz for memory of video 
content replicated standard effects of greater recognition memory for young than older adults, 
F(1, 186) = 86.65, p < .001 , 2G  = .318.  There were no effects of incentive or age X incentive 
interactions on the surprise quiz, all F < 1. (See Table 3 in Supplemental Materials for full 
results.) 
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In short, the “trait” measures of self-reported mind-wandering, boredom, and 
distractibility in everyday life replicated typical findings in the literature of higher ratings by 
younger than older adults, but the incentive conditions had different effects on attention (but not 
memory) for young and older adults:  Positive incentive decreased mind-wandering (and 
boredom) for young adults, whereas negative incentive increased mind-wandering for older 
adults. 
Statistically controlling for subjective mind-wandering eliminates incentive effects on 
performance 
For both young and older adults, the incentive effects on the CTET task primarily 
impacted the measure thought to index focused attention, and incentive effects on the subjective 
ratings primarily impacted the measure of mind-wandering.  Therefore, we next asked whether 
those subjective differences in mind-wandering might account for the incentive effects we found 
on task performance.  To test this hypothesis, we repeated the CTET ANOVA analyses, this time 
including ratings of mind-wandering during the task as a covariate.  In the analysis including 
Age, the effect of the mind-wandering covariate was significant, F(1, 185) = 21.87, p < .001, 2G  
= .090, and the previously-observed Age X Incentive interaction was eliminated, F(2, 185) = 
1.57, p = .210, 2G  = .014.  Likewise, for the analysis conducted within the older adult age group, 
the mind-wandering covariate was statistically significant, F(1, 92) = 15.48, p < .001, 2G  = .123, 
but the previously-observed effect of Incentive was not, F(2, 92) = 1.26, p = .288, 2G  = .022, and 
the pairwise comparison between the control condition and the loss condition was likewise no 
longer significant after controlling for mind-wandering, p = .357, CI = -.033 - .154.  These 
results suggest that an increase in mind-wandering under the loss incentive may account for older 
adults’ poor performance under these conditions. 
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Figure II-3 Incentive decreased mind-wandering and boredom in young adults, but increased it in older 
adults. 
Distraction from the videos was not affected for either group. See text for statistics. 
 
Discussion 
We began this paper by asking how incentives might affect your attention to this paper.  
Our results suggest that the answer may depend on how old you are:  Young adults showed little 
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effect or a slight benefit, whereas older adults had an increase in mind-wandering and a 
corresponding reduction in performance – especially when there was money to be lost. 
These results cannot be simply explained as “older adults don’t care as much about the 
money”:  Older adults were more, not less, sensitive than young adults to the incentive 
manipulation.  Furthermore, there were qualitative differences, such that the patterns for the two 
age groups were diametrically opposed:  Young adults had better performance and less mind-
wandering under incentive, especially in the gain condition, but older adults had decreased 
performance and increased mind-wandering under incentive, especially in the loss condition.   
Our results contradict the heuristic that older adults are less responsive than young adults 
to losses.  Instead, losses, not gains, had an especially strong effect on the performance of the 
older adults.  This might at first seem to contradict the predictions of Socioemotional Selectivity 
Theory and typical findings of a “positivity effect” in aging (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 
1999; Mather & Carstensen, 2005). However, a closer examination suggests that this is not 
necessarily the case.  Most studies demonstrating the typical positivity effect have varied the 
emotional valence of external stimuli (e.g., words, pictures, faces). When faced with a negative 
experience such as interpersonal conflict or other daily hassles (e.g., waiting in lines) – or in this 
case, losing money as a result of errors – older adults tend to disengage, and to do so more 
rapidly than young adults (see review by Charles, 2010).  Like the reduced attention older adults 
show to negative external stimuli, this rapid disengagement from negative experiences is 
interpreted as a strategic effort to regulate emotions.  However, in attention-demanding 
situations, it may come with the cost of reduced performance and further losses. 
Consistent with a “disengagement” interpretation, the effects of the loss incentive 
condition on older adults appear to be specifically to their focus of attention on the task, as 
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indicated both by performance on the computerized task and participants’ ratings of mind-
wandering and boredom.  By comparison, although both distraction and time-on-task increased 
errors, neither interacted with incentive (see also Estermann et al., 2014; Hickey et al., 2010).  
The control and gain conditions also presented error feedback, suggesting that it was not errors 
per se but rather the negative experience of losing money as a result of errors that decreased 
performance in the loss-incentive condition.  That the different aspects of attention assessed by 
the task are dissociable replicates our previous work: Genetic and pathological conditions 
affecting the cholinergic system selectively increase vulnerability to distraction (Berry et al., 
2014a; Kim et al., submitted), whereas overall performance is influenced by manipulations of the 
degree to which target detection relies on stimulus-driven versus goal-driven attention (Berry et 
al., 2014b). 
Goal-driven attention is crucial to target detection in the present task because the target 
does not visually differ from the standard.  Instead performance requires accurate representations 
of duration, which depend heavily on focused attention (see O’Connell et al., 2009).  In addition, 
the incentive manipulation was implemented on a task-wise, rather than trial-wise basis.  These 
features make the task similar to many real-world situations: While your attention to this paper 
receives some support from perceptual cues such as paragraph breaks, for the most part it relies 
on goal-driven attention, and although some sentences are more interesting than others, your 
judgment of whether reading the paper was rewarding will depend on your impression overall.   
These factors may also explain why results from previous laboratory studies have been 
inconsistent.  Many implemented incentive on a trial-wise basis and/or used targets perceptually 
different from nontargets, providing cues to stimulus-driven attention.  Jimura et al. (2010) found 
that although there was a smaller, transient boost for rewarded trials versus unrewarded ones, the 
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major benefits of incentive on behavioral and neural measures of cognitive control were tonic, 
affecting even unrewarded trials.  These incentive-context effects would not be detectable in 
studies manipulating incentive only on a trial-by-trial basis.  
Furthermore, Jimura et al. (2010) found that incentive-context effects primarily affected 
measures of proactive, goal-driven attention.  As described above, many previous studies of age 
differences in incentive effects have used targets that provide cues to stimulus-driven attention, 
reducing the reliance on goal-driven attention and thus potentially reducing their sensitivity to 
these incentive-context effects.  Interestingly, while gain incentives may be more effective in 
boosting transient, trial-specific control, loss incentives have more global effects (Paschke et al., 
2015).  The different timescales of gain versus loss incentive effects may contribute to findings 
of preserved gain effects but a lack of loss effects for older adults in studies with trial-wise 
incentives, and loss-specific dissociations between performance and trial-wise neural measures 
of incentive effects (e.g., Williams et al., 2017). 
Fully testing this potential explanation will require parametric manipulations of target 
salience and incentive structure beyond the scope of the current paper.  Another remaining 
question is the pathway(s) by which incentive manipulations have their effects: Does the drop in 
performance under loss incentive for older adults stem from increased anxiety about performance 
and physiological over-arousal that disrupts cognition, performance-related thoughts that distract 
attention from the task, or a general loss of motivation and engagement that might affect even 
non-cognitive tasks?   
The loss of motivation and engagement explanation would be most consistent with other 
findings suggesting that older adults rapidly disengage from negative experiences (see discussion 
by Charles, 2010), and receives indirect support from several other findings.  Low motivation 
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has been linked to more task-unrelated thoughts (Seli et al., 2015; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013), 
and Selective Engagement Theory suggests that age-related increases in cognitive costs decrease 
older adults’ motivation to engage in mentally demanding activities (Hess, 2014).  A physiologic 
measure of motivation and engagement, systolic blood pressure (SBP) initially increases with 
mental demand but declines when demand surpasses the ability to maintain performance or when 
the effort to do so is no longer worthwhile.  When these SBP changes are scaled as a function of 
subjective mental demand and effort, both the initial rise and subsequent drop were steeper in 
older adults (Ennis et al., 2013; Hess et al., 2016).  Attaching monetary costs to mental demand 
may increase older adults’ sensitivity to cognitive costs, increasing their mind-wandering and 
boredom in the loss condition; the statistical elimination of incentive effects on performance by 
controlling for mind-wandering supports this interpretation.   
Notably, the increase and subsequent decrease with mental demand observed for SBP is 
also seen in the right middle/inferior frontal gyrus region linked to incentive-attention 
interactions by Jimura et al. (2010) and Paschke et al. (2015), and is likewise shifted in older 
adults and patients with schizophrenia (see review by Lustig & Sarter, 2016).  Data from both 
humans and rodent models suggests that this pattern, termed CRUNCH (Compensation Related 
Utilization of Neural Circuits Hypothesis; Reuter-Lorenz & Cappell, 2008) in the aging 
literature, reflects right prefrontal cortex’s role as a critical hub for interactions between the 
neural systems mediating goal-directed attention, motivation, and arousal (Berry et al., 2017; 
Lustig & Sarter, 2016).  Testing whether these two phenomena (CRUNCH and SBP effects) are 
related, and how they are affected by incentives, may help improve interventions, especially for 
populations associated with reduced goal-driven attention and altered motivational processing 
compared to young adults. 
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The present study takes a first step in this direction by demonstrating important age 
differences in the effects of incentive: For older adults, don’t pay – or at least don’t penalize – 
attention!  Establishing the neural and physiological basis of these effects will require further 
research, but meanwhile the present results may inform efforts to improve older adults’ 
attentional performance in the workplace and other aspects of everyday life 
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Appendix  A.  
Additional results from main-text experiment 
Table II-2 CTET performance in each group 
Means and confidence intervals for attentional performance in each group (hits, false alarm, d’, 
and bias) 
  Time 
 Minute 1 Minute 2 Minute 3 Minute 4 
Performance Mean 95% CI Mean 
95% 
CI Mean 
95% 
CI Mean 
95% 
CI 
Young control 
no distractor 
hits (%) 82.08 
[77.03, 
87.12] 77.79 
[71.77, 
83.81] 75.67 
[69.35, 
81.99] 72.08 
[64.72, 
79.44] 
Young control 
distractor hits 
(%) 75.68 
[70.53, 
80.82] 72.70 
[66.52, 
78.89] 66.25 
[59.82, 
72.69] 63.84 
[57.50, 
70.17] 
Young gain 
no distractor 
hits (%) 87.82 
[83.39, 
92.26] 85.19 
[80.33, 
90.05] 79.59 
[72.94, 
86.25] 77.14 
[71.08, 
83.20] 
Young gain 
distractor hits 
(%) 81.53 
[76.31, 
86.74] 77.25 
[71.18, 
83.32] 74.80 
[66.89, 
82.71] 68.01 
[60.62, 
75.40] 
Young loss no 
distractor hits 
(%) 86.41 
[82.04, 
90.78] 79.90 
[74.44, 
85.36] 80.43 
[75.86, 
84.99] 74.11 
[67.67, 
80.55] 
Young loss 
distractor hits 
(%) 79.39 
[73.15, 
85.62] 77.73 
[71.63, 
83.83] 70.55 
[63.27, 
77.83] 68.26 
[61.12, 
75.40] 
Old control 
no distractor 
hits (%) 84.56 
[80.78, 
88.33] 80.16 
[74.54, 
85.79] 75.29 
[69.63, 
80.94] 74.63 
[68.32, 
80.93] 
Old control 
distractor hits 
(%) 70.29 
[64.16, 
76.42] 73.37 
[67.23, 
79.52] 70.29 
[63.67, 
76.91] 64.10 
[56.19, 
72.01] 
Old gain no 
distractor hits 
(%) 79.64 
[74.09, 
85.19] 78.56 
[72.81, 
84.31] 74.40 
[68.40, 
80.40] 68.88 
[62.31, 
75.46] 
Old gain 
distractor hits 
(%) 72.87 
[66.88, 
78.87] 68.35 
[61.42, 
75.28] 64.22 
[57.52, 
70.92] 61.11 
[54.17, 
68.06] 
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Old loss no 
distractor hits 
(%) 74.75 
[68.82, 
80.67] 72.84 
[66.09, 
79.59] 69.19 
[62.82, 
75.55] 63.01 
[55.42, 
70.60] 
Old loss 
distractor hits 
(%) 64.01 
[56.37, 
71.65] 61.77 
[54.51, 
69.04] 58.81 
[49.94, 
67.69] 52.07 
[44.19, 
59.94] 
Young control 
no distractor 
FA (%) 1.07 
[0.09, 
2.04] 1.38 
[0.20, 
2.57] 1.16 
[0.18, 
2.14] 1.32 
[0.24, 
2.40] 
Young control 
distractor FA 
(%) 1.28 
[0.22, 
2.34] 1.66 
[0.30, 
3.02] 1.63 
[0.39, 
2.86] 1.60 
[0.37, 
2.83] 
Young gain 
no distractor 
FA (%) 0.33 
[0.23, 
0.43] 0.37 
[0.21, 
0.53] 0.32 
[0.19, 
0.45] 0.35 
[0.28, 
0.42] 
Young gain 
distractor FA 
(%) 0.34 
[0.23, 
0.44] 0.36 
[0.25, 
0.46] 0.33 
[0.22, 
0.44] 0.45 
[0.31, 
0.60] 
Young loss no 
distractor FA 
(%) 0.43 
[0.21, 
0.64] 0.33 
[0.14, 
0.52] 0.28 
[0.19, 
0.38] 0.49 
[0.32, 
0.67] 
Young loss 
distractor FA 
(%) 0.30 
[0.22, 
0.38] 0.41 
[0.22, 
0.59] 0.35 
[0.23, 
0.46] 0.51 
[0.35, 
0.67] 
Old control 
no distractor 
FA (%) 1.81 
[0.82, 
2.80] 1.47 
[0.64, 
2.30] 0.97 
[0.47, 
1.47] 1.30 
[0.66, 
1.94] 
Old control 
distractor FA 
(%) 2.35 
[1.12, 
3.57] 1.78 
[0.74, 
2.83] 1.50 
[0.69, 
2.30] 1.39 
[0.41, 
2.36] 
Old gain no 
distractor FA 
(%) 1.36 
[0.73, 
1.99] 1.15 
[0.51, 
1.79] 1.02 
[0.48, 
1.55] 1.11 
[0.66, 
1.57] 
Old gain 
distractor FA 
(%) 1.34 
[0.81, 
1.86] 1.38 
[0.78, 
1.98] 0.90 
[0.56, 
1.24] 1.03 
[0.52, 
1.55] 
Old loss no 
distractor FA 
(%) 1.52 
[0.49, 
2.54] 1.25 
[0.40, 
2.11] 1.12 
[0.32, 
1.92] 1.07 
[0.42, 
1.73] 
Old loss 
distractor FA 
(%) 1.44 
[0.42, 
2.46] 1.58 
[0.60, 
2.55] 1.02 
[0.40, 
1.63] 1.28 
[0.34, 
2.21] 
Young control 
no distractor 
d' 3.68 
[3.40, 
3.97] 3.44 
[3.11, 
3.76] 3.39 
[3.11, 
3.67] 3.22 
[2.91, 
3.53] 
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Young control 
distractor d' 3.37 
[3.06, 
3.68] 3.17 
[2.87, 
3.47] 2.91 
[2.66, 
3.17] 2.85 
[2.56, 
3.13] 
Young gain 
no distractor 
d' 4.13 
[3.89, 
4.38] 4.00 
[3.75, 
4.25] 3.81 
[3.52, 
4.10] 3.62 
[3.38, 
3.86] 
Young gain 
distractor d' 3.83 
[3.59, 
4.08] 3.65 
[3.38, 
3.93] 3.63 
[3.32, 
3.93] 3.29 
[2.98, 
3.60] 
Young loss no 
distractor d' 4.01 
[3.75, 
4.28] 3.79 
[3.54, 
4.04] 3.81 
[3.58, 
4.04] 3.45 
[3.16, 
3.74] 
Young loss 
distractor d' 3.82 
[3.53, 
4.11] 3.69 
[3.40, 
3.98] 3.47 
[3.17, 
3.76] 3.23 
[2.98, 
3.48] 
Old control 
no distractor 
d' 3.54 
[3.26, 
3.82] 3.45 
[3.13, 
3.77] 3.32 
[3.08, 
3.57] 3.26 
[2.95, 
3.57] 
Old control 
distractor d' 2.87 
[2.56, 
3.18] 3.08 
[2.79, 
3.37] 3.03 
[2.75, 
3.32] 2.89 
[2.59, 
3.19] 
Old gain no 
distractor d' 3.43 
[3.12, 
3.74] 3.42 
[3.13, 
3.72] 3.28 
[3.02, 
3.55] 3.06 
[2.74, 
3.37] 
Old gain 
distractor d' 3.10 
[2.81, 
3.39] 2.95 
[2.66, 
3.25] 2.94 
[2.69, 
3.20] 2.83 
[2.56, 
3.09] 
Old loss no 
distractor d' 3.24 
[2.93, 
3.54] 3.27 
[2.94, 
3.60] 3.14 
[2.85, 
3.44] 2.87 
[2.60, 
3.15] 
Old loss 
distractor d' 2.88 
[2.58, 
3.18] 2.76 
[2.47, 
3.05] 2.84 
[2.51, 
3.18] 2.55 
[2.26, 
2.84] 
Young control 
no distractor 
bias 0.91 
[0.85, 
0.96] 0.90 
[0.85, 
0.94] 0.92 
[0.88, 
0.96] 0.91 
[0.87, 
0.96] 
Young control 
distractor bias 0.92 
[0.88, 
0.96] 0.91 
[0.86, 
0.96] 0.93 
[0.88, 
0.97] 0.94 
[0.90, 
0.98] 
Young gain 
no distractor 
bias 0.90 
[0.87, 
0.94] 0.89 
[0.82, 
0.96] 0.94 
[0.92, 
0.96] 0.94 
[0.90, 
0.97] 
Young gain 
distractor bias 0.93 
[0.90, 
0.96] 0.95 
[0.93, 
0.97] 0.95 
[0.92, 
0.97] 0.96 
[0.93, 
0.98] 
Young loss no 
distractor bias 0.91 
[0.88, 
0.94] 0.95 
[0.93, 
0.97] 0.95 
[0.93, 
0.97] 0.95 
[0.93, 
0.97] 
Young loss 
distractor bias 0.93 
[0.91, 
0.96] 0.93 
[0.90, 
0.97] 0.96 
[0.94, 
0.98] 0.95 
[0.93, 
0.97] 
Old control 
no distractor 
bias 0.81 
[0.73, 
0.88] 0.88 
[0.83, 
0.93] 0.92 
[0.88, 
0.96] 0.90 
[0.85, 
0.94] 
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Old control 
distractor bias 0.89 
[0.85, 
0.93] 0.89 
[0.84, 
0.93] 0.92 
[0.88, 
0.95] 0.95 
[0.93, 
0.97] 
Old gain no 
distractor bias 0.86 
[0.77, 
0.95] 0.90 
[0.85, 
0.95] 0.92 
[0.88, 
0.97] 0.94 
[0.92, 
0.97] 
Old gain 
distractor bias 0.91 [0.88,0.94] 0.93 
[0.89, 
0.96] 0.95 
[0.92, 
0.98] 0.96 
[0.95, 
0.98] 
Old loss no 
distractor bias 0.90 
[0.85, 
0.95] 0.91 
[0.86, 
0.96] 0.95 
[0.93, 
0.97] 0.95 
[0.93, 
0.97] 
Old loss 
distractor bias 0.94 
[0.91, 
0.97] 0.94 
[0.92, 
0.97] 0.96 
[0.95, 
0.98] 0.97 
[0.95, 
0.98] 
T 
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Table II-3 Summary of ANOVA results for CTET. 
Results for the Time factor and interactions involving it use the linear trend analysis. 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2G   
Age 1.64 1 8.59** .004 .038 
Incentive .46 2 1.20 >.250 .011 
A x I 1.18 2 3.08* .048 .027 
Error 35.59 186    
Time 2.60 1 253.01** < .001 .059 
T x A .0064 1 .62 >.250 <.001 
T x I .017 2 .82 >.250 <.001 
T x A x I .0072 2 .35 >.250 <.001 
Error 
(time) 
1.91 186    
Distractor 2.58 1 161.23** < .001 .058 
D x A .070 1 4.37* .038 .002 
D x I .0024 2 .076 >.250 <.001 
D x A x I .016 2 .51 
  
>.250 <.001 
Error 
(distractor) 
2.98 186    
D x T .0012 1 .16 >.250 <.001 
D x T x A .012 1 1.63 .203  <.001 
D x T x I .0027 2 .19 >.250 <.001 
D x T x A 
x I 
.010 2 .72 >.250 <.001 
Error (D x 
T) 
1.33 186    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
 
 
Table II-4 State (post-experiment) subjective attention, and quiz score for distractor video content. 
 Young 
Control       
(n = 32) 
Young 
Gain       
(n = 32) 
Young 
Loss       
(n = 32)
Old 
Control       
(n = 32) 
Old   
Gain       
(n = 32) 
Old  
Loss       
(n = 32)
Exit questionnaire       
1. At times of this task, it was hard for me to keep my mind from wandering. 
 mean 3.56 3.13  3.34 2.38 2.66 2.50 
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 SD 1.08 1.36 1.10 1.21 1.00 1.30 
2. (reverse scored) During the task, my thoughts seldom drifted from the subject 
before me. 
 mean 3.38 3.47 3.38 2.63 3.09 3.00 
 SD 1.16 1.14 1.10 1.31 1.28 1.24 
3. I was easily bored during this task. 
 mean 3.63 2.69 3.06 1.88 2.13 2.38 
 SD 1.13 1.23 1.50 1.01 1.31 1.21 
4. I had difficulty in keeping my attention focused on this long, tedious task. 
 mean 3.56 2.72 3.31 2.09 2.25 2.75 
 SD 0.95 1.11 1.23 1.17 0.92 1.30 
5. No matter how hard I tried to concentrate, I felt easily distracted by the videos 
playing. 
 mean 3.16 2.78 2.71 2.00 2.50 2.34 
 SD 1.08 1.18 1.14 0.95 1.14 1.15 
Surprise quiz       
% correct recognition of distractor content 
 mean 73.04 69.58 71.04 44.79 46.46 39.37 
 SD 23.37 16.24 17.32 16.78 21.45 26.36 
 
Test of correlations reported in prior publications 
 To enable meta-analyses and test replicability across datasets, we consistently test the 
same set of correlations across our studies using the video CTET, PAC questionnaires, and post-
CTET questionnaire (Berry, Li et al., 2014; Berry et al., 2014; Kim et al., submitted.; with 
median |r| = .21; range .15 - .67).  Below we report the results for the control group to test 
replication (a priori estimate power estimate indicates n = 61 for .80 power to detect r = .35) , 
and for the incentive groups to test for potential deviation from the patterns usually seen in our 
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prior studies, which have not incentivized performance.  Since the effects of incentive were 
similar within each age group, we combined the positive and negative conditions for the latter 
tests.  Note that this increases the sensitivity (sample size) for the latter tests, with power = .80 
for a r = .167 (two-sided test). 
 We have generally found that correlations between performance in the standard, no-
distraction condition of the CTET and self-reported mind-wandering are consistent across 
studies, whereas correlations with the distractor effect (difference between performance in the 
standard condition and the distractor condition) are less reliable.  This may be due in part to the 
inherent decrease in reliability when using difference scores.  These general findings were also 
observed in the current control-condition (no-incentive) data set, with r = -.28, p = .026 for the 
target-detection/focus of attention measure’s correlation with the PAC measure of “trait” mind-
wandering in everyday life, and r -.45, p < .001 for the correlation with self-reported difficulty 
keeping attention focused during the task.  Both of these effects were reduced or even eliminated 
by the incentive manipulation, r = .004, p = .97 for the correlation between performance and 
PAC mind-wandering, r = -.18, p = .044 for the correlation between performance and self-
reported difficulty keeping attention focused during the task. 
For the distractor effect (difference between performance in the standard and distractor 
conditions of the CTET), the control group showed a marginal correlation, r = .24, p = .05 for the 
correlation with the PAC-D measure of distraction in everyday life, but not for self-reported 
distractibility during the task r = .13, p = .318 or memory for the distractor videos, r = -.01, p = 
.952.  These patterns were to some degree reduced or even reversed for the incentive group, at 
least for the subjective measures:  r = -.24, p = .006 for the correlation with the PAC-D measure 
of distractibility everyday life, r = .19, p = .03 for the correlation with self-reported distractibility 
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during the task, and r = -.03, p = .717 for the correlation with memory for the distractor videos’ 
content. 
 
Pilot experiment results 
Prior to the experiment described in the text, we ran a pilot study using young adults from 
the Psychology Subject Pool and a loss-incentive condition that started at $10 (rather than $20).  
After completing that study, we realized that comparing subject pool young adults to paid, 
community-recruited older adults was potentially problematic.  As indicated below, in the 
control condition subject-pool young adults performed worse than older adults and the incentive 
manipulation showed only trend-level results.  We therefore collected new samples of paid 
young adults for all conditions and older adults for the incentive conditions, using a larger 
incentive manipulation ($20); this is the study reported in the main text.   
The major results from this pilot study are reported below.  Several features are worth noting:    
1. As in the study reported in the main text, the primary effects of incentive were on the 
target-detection measure reflecting the focused, goal-directed attention, rather than on 
distraction or time-on-task effects.   
2. Also following the same pattern as the study reported in the main text, the loss-incentive 
condition tended to improve the performance and decrease self-reported mind-wandering, 
boredom, and distractibility in the young adults, but to decrease performance and increase 
the self-report measures of mind-wandering, boredom, and distractibility in the older 
adults. 
3. In the control condition, older adults had significantly better performance overall than did 
young adults, F(1,62) = 5.73, p = .02, 2G  = .076, whereas in the loss incentive condition, 
 45
the performance of the two age groups was nearly identical, F < .0005.  Critical results 
are illustrated in Figure 1 and Table 5. 
4. Controlling for self-reported mind-wandering (using it as a covariate in the ANOVA 
model) eliminated the advantage for the older adults in the control condition, F<1.   This 
is consistent with the idea that subject-pool young adults are less motivated and more 
likely to mind-wander than community-dwelling older adults, and that this greater 
tendency towards mind-wandering plays an important role in performance on the task. 
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Figure II-4 Older adults outperformed young adults in the control condition, whereas in the loss incentive 
condition, the performance of the two age groups was nearly identical. 
Different colors (control = black, green = gain, red = loss) and shades (dark = young adults, light = older 
adults) are used to highlight the different conditions.  Error bars represent confidence intervals (between-
subjects; note that the distraction manipulation is within-subjects).  Results are collapsed across the Time 
factor for clarity. 
 
 
Table II-5 Pilot study demographic information and self-reported measures. 
Pilot study demographic information, self-report of trait (PAC) and state (post-experiment) subjective 
attention, and quiz score for distractor video content. Young adult subjects were recruited from the 
Psychology Subject Pool (SP). 
 
  SP       
Control       
(n = 32) 
SP   
Loss       
(n = 32) 
Old 
Control       
(n = 32) 
Old  
Loss       
(n = 32) 
Age     
 mean 18.63 18.63 70.38 72.03 
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 SD .83 1.04 5.91 6.83 
Years of Education     
 mean 13.20 13.47 17.12 16.91 
 SD 1.24 1.22 2.95 2.84 
ERVT 
 mean 19.02 15.88 31.48 31.43 
 SD 6.11 5.20 7.07 8.25 
PAC Mind-Wandering 
 mean 14.78 14.78 12.34 12.78 
 SD 3.84 3.65 2.48 2.89 
PAC Boredom 
 mean 13.00 13.31 11.03 11.63 
 SD 3.87 3.26 3.15 2.46 
PAC Distractibility 
 mean 15.53 15.06 13.59 13.63 
 SD 3.48 3.46 4.41 3.17 
Exit questionnaire     
1. At times of this task, it was hard for me to keep my mind from 
wandering. 
 mean 4.03 3.53 2.38 2.41 
 SD .86 1.19 1.21 1.01 
2. (reverse scored) During the task, my thoughts seldom drifted from 
the subject before me. 
 mean 3.75 3.00 2.63 2.71 
 SD .88 1.16 1.31 1.14 
3. I was easily bored during this task. 
 mean 4.09 3.38 1.88 1.97 
 SD 1.09 1.34 1.01 1.12 
4. I had difficulty in keeping my attention focused on this long, 
tedious task. 
 mean 3.84 3.47 2.09 2.31 
 SD 1.05 1.16 1.17 .97 
5. No matter how hard I tried to concentrate, I felt easily distracted 
by the videos playing. 
 mean 3.34 2.97 2.00 2.41 
 SD .97 1.12 .95 1.07 
Surprise quiz    
% correct recognition of distractor content 
 mean 74.57 77.71 44.79 37.03 
 SD 18.42 15.48 16.78 21.40 
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Table II-6 Summary of excluded subjects. 
Subjects in the Prior Screening Criteria column were those who did not meet health and other screening 
criteria described in the method section. Subjects in the Poor Performance column were excluded due to 
overall very poor performance (hit rate below 40% during the first minute of the No Distractor condition, 
and false alarms larger than 3 standard deviations above the mean).  Subjects in the Others column were 
excluded due to reasons including missing data and technical errors (e.g. participant failed to follow 
instructions, reported having a migraine or being sleep-deprived to the point where they felt it affected 
their performance, computer error).  The dashed line divides the pilot study from that reported in the main 
text. 
 
Group 
Prior 
Screening 
Criteria 
Poor 
Performance Others 
Subject Pool Control  20 15 8 
Subject Pool Loss 6 8 0 
Pilot Old Loss 2 8 5 
Young Control 11 10 2 
Young Gain 2 2 4 
Young Loss 12 4 1 
Old Control 4 3 2 
Old Gain  2 7 3 
Old Loss 3 2 3 
Total 62 59 28 
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Table II-7 Summary of ANOVA results for CTET in the pilot study. 
Results for the Time factor and interactions involving it use the linear trend analysis. 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2G   
Age .69 1 2.94 .089 .021 
Incentive .0019 1 .008 >.250 <.001 
A x I .716 1 3.04 .084 .021 
Error 29.20 124    
Time 1.74 1 170.60** < .001 .050 
T x A .023 1 2.25 .136 <.001 
T x I .00063 1 .062 >.250 <.001 
T x A x I .034 1 3.32 .071 <.001 
Error 
(time) 
1.26 124    
Distractor 2.12 1 146.02** < .001 .060 
D x A .011 1 .77 >.250 <.001 
D x I .000022 1 .0015 >.250 <.001 
D x A x I .011 1 .75 >.250 <.001 
Error 
(distractor) 
1.80 124    
D x T .0016 1 .26 >.250 <.001 
D x T x A .0012 1 .19 >.250 <.001 
D x T x I .030 1 4.80* .030 <.001 
D x T x A 
x I 
.00028 1 .045 >.250 <.001 
Error (D x 
T) 
.78 124    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
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Chapter III. Do dollars distract or demotivate?   Paradoxical effects of monetary incentive 
on attention in younger and older adults 
 
Abstract 
It is a common assumption that offering monetary incentives can increase motivation and 
performance. However, our previous study in Chapter II found deleterious effects of monetary 
incentive in older adults. The present study aimed to replicate the previous study and further 
examine how incentive structure may affect attention. Younger and older adults completed a task 
that assesses both the initial focus of attention and the ability to sustain attention under three 
incentive conditions: loss, gain, or control. For the incentivized conditions, experimental runs 
alternated between incentivized (potential to lose money from or gain money towards a 
maximum performance bonus of $10) versus non-incentivized (no money lost for errors, no 
money gained for good performance) conditions.  In the control condition, there was no 
performance bonus at stake.  Monetary incentives reduced both young and older adults’ 
attentional performance compared to the situation when incentive was not offered at all. When 
incentives were offered, performance was worse in runs when incentives were absent. Additional 
results from self-report measures suggest that for young adults, incentives may be distracting and 
lead to worse performance. In contrast, older adults were more intrinsically motivated, and the 
external incentive bonus appeared to decrease their motivation. 
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Introduction 
The experiment reported in Chapter II revealed the somewhat surprising finding that loss 
incentives reduced the performance of older adults. At first, this seems to contradict the claims of 
positivity theory or at least the common heuristic interpretation that it predicts older adults will 
have decreased responsiveness to loss.  However, we argued that the results are in good 
agreement with a more nuanced and mechanistic version of the positivity effect: By this 
interpretation, the reason older adults often seem to be less affected by negative situations or 
information is that they are more likely and more rapid than young adults to disengage when 
faced with negative situations (see review by Charles, 2010). This disengagement would be one 
way of explaining the increased self-reported mind-wandering in the loss-incentive condition for 
older adults, and would be especially detrimental to a focused-attention task, such as the 
Continuous Temporal Expectancy Task (CTET; O’Connell et al., 2009) in Chapter II. 
The present study aims to test the replication of the impact of loss incentive on the 
performance of older adults, and to explore more deeply the dimensions of motivation and 
incentive processing that may have contributed to our results – and that may also explain the 
conflicting findings across other studies in this domain. Specifically, in addition to the between-
subjects manipulation of incentive condition (control, loss, gain) used in the prior experiment, we 
also implemented a within-subjects manipulation (incentivized, non-incentivized runs) within 
loss and gain conditions. This allowed us to test the potential effects of the temporal dimension 
of incentives: Several previous studies have suggested that global, reward-context effects (is 
incentive present in the session or run overall?) may be different than more local, trial-specific 
effects (is incentive at play in this trial?), and that in particular loss incentives may have more 
global effects, whereas gain incentives may have more local effects (Paschke et al., 2015).    
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In addition, we also examined a more internal, potentially “trait” like dimension of 
motivation and incentive processing, the degree to which people are intrinsically versus 
extrinsically motivated.  Our previous results of lower mind-wandering and boredom in older 
adults suggested that they may have more intrinsically motivated than young adults to do well on 
the task.  We therefore measured intrinsic motivation more directly, using the Intrinsic 
Motivation Inventory (IMI, Ryan, 1982).  Furthermore, it has been suggested that high levels of 
intrinsic motivation may lead to a negative response or disengagement in response to extrinsic 
motivation (Deci & Ryan, 2012).  We therefore examined this possibility, and how it might 
interact with age differences and the global and local effects of different incentive valences (loss 
vs gain).  Here I briefly review the literature on global and local as well as extrinsic and intrinsic 
effects of incentive processing and motivation before specifying the hypotheses of this study in 
further detail. 
Temporal dimensions of incentive processing: Global versus local effects  
Many studies have used the monetary incentive delay (MID task; Eppiner et al., 2011) 
task or its variants (see review by Lutz & Widmer, 2014). In these studies, participants were 
asked to respond to a trial after a cue indicated the amount of money that could be earned or lost 
for successful performance or failure. Within an incentive block, both incentive and neutral trials 
were presented to participants. The studies examined the local or trial specific incentive effect by 
comparing incentive trials to neutral trials within an incentive block, whereas a global or context-
specific incentive effect was investigated by comparing neutral trials in an incentive block to 
neutral trials in a control block. Jimura and colleagues (2010) found incentive-context effects and 
that was primarily impacted by measures of proactive, goal-driven attention. Another study by 
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Paschke and colleagues (2015) demonstrated that gain incentives may improve performance at a 
local (trial specific) level, but the effects of loss incentive are more global.  
In view of these intriguing results, we believe that the temporal-dynamic effects may be 
useful to test age-related differences in gain and loss incentives. A study by Williams and 
colleagues (2018) found transient effects of gain and loss incentives, as well as sustained effects 
of gain incentives only in congruent trials of a Franker task. They did not find behavioral 
evidence of incentive-based modulation in the incongruent trials, and they thus concluded that 
there was no behavioral effect of incentive-based modulation in attentional control. As discussed 
earlier, these studies manipulated monetary incentives in a trial-wise manner, which may not 
capture real-world experiences. We believe that using a more ecologically-valid test can provide 
additional insights into temporal dynamic effects of incentives.  
Intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation 
One of the major theories have developed from behavioral works of motivation is the 
self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985; 2012). Interestingly, the SDT has a multi-
dimensional prediction of the local versus global effect of monetary incentives. This theory 
distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsically motivated activities are 
inherently satisfying whereas extrinsically motivated activities are driven by external rewards or 
incentives (e.g. food or money). Since extrinsic rewards derive from external sources, these 
rewards may undermine one’s self-determination and intrinsic motivation. This theory is often 
cited to explain findings of negative effects of monetary incentives and may predict a detrimental 
incentive effect on a global level (Deci et al. 1999, 2001).  
On a local level, the SDT predicts reduced performance in non-incentivized trials due to a 
reduction of engagement after the withdrawal of performance-based incentives (Vansteenkiste et 
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al., 2010). In other words, participants may engage in less of the incentivized behavior after the 
withdrawal of the incentive than they would have if incentive had never been offered. 
Importantly, the reduction in non-incentivized trials may contribute to a global undermining 
effect of incentives. Note that although this prediction is consistent with previous findings of 
local effect that performance differs between incentivized run and non-incentivized run (Paschke 
et al., 2015), the explanation and interpretation differ. While the local effect of incentives in 
studies by Paschke and colleagues (2015) has been interpreted as a beneficial effect 
(performance in the incentivized runs is better than performance in non-incentivized runs), the 
prediction by the SDT focuses on the diminished engagement after the withdrawal of the 
incentive (performance in the non-incentivized runs is was worse than performance in 
incentivized runs). The reduction of engagement has been considered a result of decreased 
intrinsic motivation. This reduction will be larger for larger amount of incentives or stronger 
extrinsic motivation (Goswami & Urminsky, 2017).   
The present experiment   
As noted above, the present experiment had two major goals.  The first was to test the 
replication of our prior results, the second was to examine the contributions of other aspects of 
incentive and motivation processing, especially global (context) versus local (trial; or in our case, 
run) effects, and how these might interact with each other and contribute to age differences in 
performance and the response of performance to different incentive manipulations. 
To replicate our previous study, we tested the following set of hypotheses:  
1. Based on our previous findings, we expect to find a detrimental effect of loss on 
attentional performance in older adults, and no effect or a small beneficial effect 
on the performance of young adults.  
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2.  We expect to replicate our previous findings in Chapter II that older adults 
generally report lower subjective inattention for both trait and state measures 
compared to young adults.  
3. Again, to replicate the results in Chapter II, self-reported measures of inattention 
will correlate with overall CTET performance. 
4.  Finally, statistically controlling self-reported mind-wandering will eliminate age-
related differences in CTET performance.  
For temporal dynamic effects of incentive, we tested the following set of hypotheses:  
1. Loss will have a greater global (context) effect than will the gain condition 
(Paschke, 2015), and this effect may differ between older and younger adults 
(testing two explanations).  
2. Performance will be better in incentivized runs than in non-incentivized runs, 
which suggests a local effect. This effect may differ between older and younger 
adults (testing two explanations).  
3. Compared to young adults, older adults will report higher intrinsic motivation and 
larger reduction of self-reported motivation in experimental condition than in the 
control condition.  
4. As predicted by SDT, for the experimental conditions (gain and loss), the self-
reported mind-wandering and boredom will decrease in incentivized runs 
compared to non-incentivized runs.  
5. For the experimental conditions, extrinsic motivation and incentive distractibility 
will increase in incentivized runs compared to non-incentivized runs.  
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6. Differences in performance between incentivized and non-incentivized runs will 
positively correlate with participants’ self-reported extrinsic motivation. 
Methods 
All methods, materials, and procedures were approved by the University of Michigan 
Institutional Review Board.   
Participants 
 One hundred and seventeen young adults and 169 older adults were included in the 
analyses reported here (additional data collection to complete counterbalance orders is ongoing; 
this reports a “freeze point” to allow timely completion of the dissertation).  An a priori power 
analysis conducted in G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul et al., 2007) indicated that a total sample size of n  
=  252 (42 subjects per group) would be required to detect the critical interaction at a moderate 
effect size. 
 Young adults (83 female, mean age = 20.31 years, range 18-29) were undergraduate 
students recruited from the University of Michigan and were paid $10 per hour for participation.  
Older adults (98 female, mean age = 70.69, range 60-85) were recruited from the Ann Arbor 
community and were paid $12 per hour for participation.  Participants in each age group were 
randomly assigned to one of three incentive conditions:  control (received no performance 
incentive), gain condition (start with $0, potential to earn up to $10) and loss condition (start 
with $10, lose 20 cents per error).  Participants in the gain and loss conditions completed 10 runs 
of the CTET, alternating two run types between incentivized (opportunity to gain/lose money) 
versus non-incentivized (no money gained or lost for performance) conditions.  Participants were 
screened to ensure physical and psychological health with no history of anxiety, depression, 
ADHD, or head injury, and no use of medications that affect cognition.  Consistent with usual 
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procedures in our lab, the Extended Range Vocabulary Test Version 3 (ERVT; Educational 
Testing Service, 1976) was used as a screen for participants who might not understand the 
instructions or were generally unmotivated; a minimum score of 9 out of a possible 48 was 
required.  Data from individuals with overall very poor performance on the computer task (hit 
rate below 40% during the first minute of the No Distractor condition, and false alarms larger 
than 3 standard deviations above the mean) indicating a failure to understand or engage in the 
task were excluded. For older adults, a  Mini Mental State Examination score (MMSE; Cockrell 
& Folstein, 1988) of 27 or greater was required (see Table 1 for demographic information).   
 
 
Table III-1 Demographic information and self-reported measures. 
Demographic information and self-reported difficulties with attentional control in everyday life (Poor 
Attentional Control scale; PAC; see text for details). 
 
  Young 
Control       
(n = 39) 
Young 
Gain       
(n = 
49) 
Young 
Loss       
(n = 29)
Old 
Control       
(n = 57) 
Old   
Gain       
(n = 
60) 
Old  
Loss       
(n = 
52) 
Age     
 Mean 20.67 20.41 19.66 71.63 70.28 70.12 
 SD 2.68 1.61 2.64 6.40 5.22 6.94 
Years of Education       
 Mean 14.49 14.67 13.55 17.25 17.65 16.83 
 SD 1.89 1.38 1.85 2.31 2.50 2.55 
ERVT       
 Mean 21.35 19.78 16.61 31.85 30.25 29.19 
 SD 6.37 6.96 6.20 7.70 8.25 7.14 
PAC Mind-wandering       
 Mean 14.49 14.84 14.69 12.28 12.70 11.94 
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 SD 4.08 4.22 3.52 2.74 2.83 3.11 
PAC Boredom       
 Mean 12.85 13.86 13.83 10.79 11.25 10.88 
 SD 3.13 3.14 2.39 3.04 3.17 3.07 
PAC Distractibility       
 Mean 16.31 16.80 15.48 13.33 13.47 13.00 
 SD 4.66 3.81 4.49 3.20 3.40 3.20 
 
Materials 
Continuous Temporal Expectancy Task (CTET)  
See Figure 1 for an illustration of the task and experimental manipulation. The task in the 
present study was adapted from the Continuous Temporal Expectancy Task (CTET; Berry, Li, 
Lin, & Lustig, 2014; O’Connell et. al., 2009).  The CTET was presented on a Dell PC computer 
using E-prime version 2.0.8.90.  During the task, a black and white grid with squares divided 
diagonally into halves rotated randomly at 90, 180, or 270 degrees at a standard interval of 800 
ms, with occasional longer target intervals of 1070 ms.  Participants were instructed to monitor 
the duration of rotations and press the space bar when they detected the target (longer duration 
rotation).  Before beginning the experiment, participants were given 6 practice runs (3 targets 
each).  To ensure that participants understood the task, the duration difference between standard 
trials and target trials was exaggerated during the first practice (standard: 800ms; target: 
1600ms).  The duration difference for the remaining 5 practice runs was identical to that used 
during the testing runs (800 ms standard, 1070 ms target).  Participants had to achieve 100% on 
at least one of these 5 practice runs in order to proceed to the experiment.  The experiment had 
10 testing runs (4 min each) with 24 targets per run.  Stimuli were presented in a pseudo-
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randomly intermixed fashion, such that the number of standard trials between two target trials 
ranged from 7 to 17 trials (with an average of 10 standard trials intervening between targets).  A 
correct response (hit) was recorded if participants responded within 2.46s following the target 
offset.  Responses outside this time window were coded as false alarms.  At the end of each run, 
participants were given feedback on their performance and took a one-minute break.   
For participants in the incentive conditions, the task was identical with the addition of a 
monetary incentive, which participants were informed about after they completed the practice.  
In the loss condition, participants were told that they could earn up to a $10 bonus based on task 
performance, and that each error (either missing a target or making a false alarm) would cost 
them 20 cents. Ten dollars were placed in front of the participant at the beginning of the task, and 
the amount was reduced as needed at the end of each run. The amount of loss was displayed at 
the feedback screen.  The instructions for the gain procedure were the same, with the exception 
that participants started with $0 and reward earned during the trial was placed on the table after 
the feedback screen was displayed.   
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Figure III-1 Continuous temporal expectancy task (CTET) with incentives. 
a. Participants viewed a grid that typically rotated every 800 ms (90, 180, or 270° rotation, randomly 
intermixed) and were to press the spacebar in response to the longer-duration target (1070ms).  b. There 
were 3 incentive conditions: control, gain, and loss. Participants in the control group did not receive any 
performance-based bonus. In the gain condition, participants could earn up to $10 by responding 
correctly, while in the loss condition, they began with $10 and lost money for incorrect responses. c. In 
both the gain and loss condition, participants had the opportunity to win or lose money on alternating runs 
of the task.  
 
Questionnaires 
 Poor Attentional Control (PAC) scale.  Participants rated 36 statement on cognition and 
attention in everyday life from the Imaginal Processes Inventory (Singer & Antrobus, 1970) as to 
how true each statement was of them (1 = not all true of me; 5 = very true of me).  As in 
previous papers from our group (Berry, Demeter, et al., 2014; Berry, Li, et al., 2014; Kim et al., 
2017, submitted; Lin, Berry, Lustig, 2017, submitted), final analyses focused on the 15 items 
from the mind-wandering, boredom, and distractibility subscales, which make up the Poor 
Attentional Control (PAC) scale identified in a factor analysis (Huba, Singer, Aneshensel, & 
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Antrobus, 1982).  This scale was used as the trait measure of attentional function in everyday 
life, and thus was administered before participants completed the computer task.  
 State Attention and Motivation Questionnaire (SAMQ).  After each run, participants were 
given the SAMQ consisting of 6 questions on their level of mind-wandering, boredom, and 
motivation during the task based on a scale from 1 to 5.  (See Supplemental Table 2.)  The 
questions were created with similar form and content to items from PAC.  As in our prior work 
(Berry, Demeter, et al., 2014; Berry, Li, et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2017, submitted), question “I had 
difficulty in keeping my attention focused on this long tedious task.” was used as a state measure 
of mind-wandering; question “I was easily bored during this task.” as boredom.  The final two 
questions were added for the purposes of the present study, and assessed whether feedback 
and/or incentive might be either distracting (Q5) or motivating (Q6).   
 Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI). After completing the CTET, IMI was administrated 
after the SAMQ of the last run of CTET. The IMI is a standard 22-item questionnaire assessing 
participants’ subjective experience for a targeted activity in an experiment (Ryan, 1982).  It has 
good internal reliability (overall coefficient alpha = .85; McAuley, Duncan, and Tammen, 1987; 
Markland & Hardy, 1997) and is used to assess participants’ intrinsic motivation and self-
regulations (e.g., Ryan, 1982).  There are several different versions; we used the 22-item version.  
There are four subscales: interest/enjoyment, perceived choice, perceived competence, and 
pressure/tension (See Supplemental Table 3).   
Analysis 
 Analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS version 24.  As in prior work (Berry, 
Demeter, et al., 2014; Berry, Li, et al., 2014; O'Connell et al., 2009), average minute-by-minute 
hit rates (correct detections of target) were the primary dependent variable for the CTET.  
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Analyses of signal detection measures were also included in the supplemental section after the 
correspondent ANOVA using hit rates.  Analyses below therefore report the session average for 
each condition.   
 The study was designed to test hypotheses both about between- and within-subjects 
effects of incentives, and whether those effects might differ according by age group and 
incentive type (loss vs gain). The overall study design (Age (between-subjects: young, old) X 
Incentive Type (between-subjects: control, loss, gain) X Run Type (within-subjects:  tnon-
incentivized, incentivized) X Time (within-subjects: minute 1-4), allows for a large number of 
potential comparisons, with Run Order (between-subjects; incentivized first, non-incentive first) 
potentially adding an additional dimension.  We therefore report a series of analyses targeted at 
our hypotheses, with additional post-hoc analyses for unexpected results or exploratory 
questions.  The omnibus ANOVA and all interactions (including those not of direct theoretical 
interest) are included in supplementary Table 4.1 and 4.2 for completeness. 
A priori hypotheses: Replication 
1. Between-subjects, loss will have a detrimental effect on the focused-attention 
performance of older adults, with no effect or a small beneficial effect on the 
performance of young adults.  This hypothesis tests the overall replication of the 
between-subjects findings reported in Chapter II. This will be tested by examining the 
main effect of between-subject factor Incentive Type collapsing across different run 
types.  Alternatively, one might ask this question by comparing the performance of 
the control subjects to the incentivized runs of participants in the experimental (loss 
and gain) groups, and so we also ran this analysis to see if it would provide 
converging or contradictory evidence. 
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2. Older adults will have lower self-reported ratings of mind-wandering, distraction, 
and boredom on both trait (PAC score) and state (post-task questionnaire) measures.  
Older adults typically have lower self-reported ratings of mind-wandering in 
everyday life (Grodsky and Giambra, 1990–1991; Giambra, 2000; Jackson and 
Balota, 2012; Jackson, Weinstein, and Balota, 2013) and we previously (Chapter II) 
showed that their ratings of boredom and distraction in everyday life, as well as their 
ratings on these three factors after task performance, were also lower than those of 
young adults.  We expect to replicate these effects. 
3. State attention measures will correlate with overall CTET performance. As reported 
in several studies from our lab (Berry, Demeter, et al., 2014; Berry, Li, et al., 2014; 
Kim et al., 2017, submitted), we generally find small to moderate effect of 
correlations between self-reported inattention and CTET performance. 
4. Using mind-wandering as a covariate will eliminate both age differences and 
incentive-group differences in CTET performance. In the study reported in Chapter II, 
we found that statistically controlling mind-wandering eliminated age by incentive 
differences in the CTET.  We expected to replicate these effects. 
A priori hypotheses: Temporal dynamic incentive effects 
1. Between-subjects, loss will have a greater global effect (“carryover” impact even on 
non-incentivized runs) than will the gain condition, and this effect will differ between 
older and younger adults.  As described in the introduction, we compared the control 
subjects’ performance to the non-incentivized runs of subjects in the incentivized 
conditions to assess the sustained effect of incentives. 
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2. For the within-subjects manipulation of incentive vs non-incentive, performance will 
be better in the incentivized runs than the non-incentivized runs, suggesting a local 
effect. The main analysis for this question is the comparison of incentivized versus 
incentivized runs for the gain and loss groups.  As secondary hypotheses, the young 
adults may show stronger within-subjects effect of gains than do older adults (as older 
adults may be less flexible in adjusting performance in response to incentive), but the 
two age groups may show similar effects for the loss incentive condition, (as loss has 
been suggested to have stronger context effects than gain even in studies with 
younger adults; Paschke and colleagues (2015). 
3. Older adults will show higher intrinsic motivation compared to young adults for 
overall session, and compared to young adults, they will show larger reduction of 
self-reported motivation in experimental conditions compared to the control 
condition. For intrinsic motivation, the main analysis of this question is to compare 
older adults’ ratings on IMI to that of young adults. For the extrinsic motivation, the 
main analysis is to conduct a factorial age group x incentive condition ANOVA on 
participants’ self-reported motivation.  
4. For the “state” measures of mind-wandering and boredom, the monetary incentives 
will decrease boredom and mind-wandering in the incentivized runs compared to 
non-incentivized runs.  This hypothesis will be tested by comparing the mind-
wandering and boredom during the incentivized runs to the non-incentivized runs for 
participants in gain and loss conditions. As secondary hypotheses, young adults will 
show larger increases in boredom for non-incentivized runs than for incentivized runs 
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than will older adults (as older adults generally reported low boredom across 
incentive conditions described in Chapter II).  
5. For the “state” measures of motivation and distractibility, the monetary incentives 
will increase motivation and distractibility in incentivized run than for non-
incentivized runs. This hypothesis will be tested by comparing the motivation and 
distractibility during the incentivized runs to the non-incentivized runs for 
participants in gain and loss conditions. 
6. The performance reduction between non-incentivized runs and incentivized runs will 
positively correlate with participants’ self-reported motivation.  The analysis of this 
question is the correlation between performance difference between incentivized runs 
and non-incentivized runs. We expected to only see this relationship in the 
experimental conditions but not the control condition 
Results 
CTET results are illustrated in Figure 2.  Statistical analyses reported here focus on 
effects involving age and the incentive manipulation; full ANOVA results for the CTET are 
reported in Table 5.1 and 5.2 4.  
We replicated standard effects of time-on-task declines (linear trend), F(1, 280) = 392.10, 
p < .001, 2  = .583.   Before going on to the hypothesis tests, we note three unexpected general 
findings: First, older adults had significantly better performance overall than did young adults, 
F(1, 280) = 7.53, p < .01, 2  = .026.  Second, the interaction between age group and time was 
also significant, F(1, 280) = 7.86, p < .01, 2  = .027.  A follow-up slope analysis suggested a 
steeper time-on-task performance decline in young adults, t(284) = 2.76, p < .01, CI =  .004 - 
.021.  This was also the case when analyzing the data only for the control condition, F(1, 94) = 
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4.66, p < .05, 2  = .047, suggesting it was not driven entirely by age differences in sustaining 
attention in response to the incentive.  Third, the interaction between incentive condition and 
time was significant, F(2, 280) = 4.23, p < .05, 2  = .029, suggesting incentive conditions 
reduced participants’ ability to sustain attention over time.  Performance in the gain and loss 
conditions declined at similar rates, t < 1.  In contrast, performance in the control condition 
declined more slowly than in the gain or loss conditions, t(203) = 2.82, p < .01, CI =  .005 - .025, 
t(175) = 2.43, p < .05, CI =  .002 - .023, respectively. To determine whether the differences in 
sustained attention over time might influence conclusions about the focused-attention effects of 
either age group or incentive group, we also analyzed only minute 1.  In this case, older adults 
performed only marginally better than did young adults, F(1, 280) = 3.65, p = .057, 2  = .013 , 
and the main effect of Incentive remained significant, F(2, 280) = 5.07, p < .01, 2  = .035.  The 
Age x Incentive interaction did not approach significance, F < 1.  Thus, it does not appear that 
the differences in the results here versus Chapter II are an artifact of time-on-task effects. As 
these were not expected findings and not present in our earlier datasets, they should be 
interpreted with caution. We report them here for completeness and in case they may influence 
the interpretation of our other results.   
For the questionnaire measures, the PAC scale was used as a “trait” measure of attention 
in everyday life whereas the State Attention and Motivation Questionnaire assessed participants’ 
subjective experience during the task (See Figure 3). See Table 1 in the main text for means and 
standard deviations on the PAC; See Table 2 in the Supplemental Materials for means and 
standard deviations on the State Attention and Motivation Questionnaire. 
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Figure III-2 Attentional performance is affected by incentive condition, run type, and age group. 
Error bars represent standard errors (between-subjects; note that the run type manipulation is within-
subjects). See Table 1 in Supplemental Materials for performance measures. 
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Figure III-3 Self-reported state measures are impacted by run type and age group. 
See text for statistics and Table 2 in Supplemental Materials for means and standard deviations of State 
Attention and Motivation Questionnaire.  
 
 
Replication 
1. Loss incentives, as well as gain incentives, had a detrimental effect on the focused-attention 
performance of both older and younger adults. 
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 We had originally hypothesized that loss incentive would have a detrimental effect on 
older adults’ performance, while having no effect or a small beneficial effect on performance of 
young adults.  However, young and older adults reacted similarly to the incentive manipulation. 
Compared to the control condition where monetary incentive was not offered at all, the incentive 
conditions significantly decreased performance for both young and older adults, F(2, 280) = 
7.32, p < .01, 2  = .050, with the Dunnett’s t-test showing that performance in the control 
condition was significantly better than the gain as well as loss conditions t(203) = 2.68, p <.01, 
CI = .015 - .096, t(175) = 3.72, p <.001, CI = .039 - .126, respectively, while performances in 
gain and loss conditions were similar, t(188) = 1.21, p =.229, CI = - .017 - .071.   
 Although the Age x Incentive interaction was not significant, F <1, we continued with 
targeted analyses within each age group based on our a-priori hypothesis.  For each age group, 
we conducted a follow-up ANOVA with the between-subjects factor Incentive and the within-
subjects factors Run Type and Time, and used post-hoc two-sided Dunnett’s t-tests to compare 
the control condition to each incentive condition (Details of ANOVAs, see Tables 6.1-7.2 in 
supplemental materials).  For young adults, the main effect of incentive condition was 
significant, F(2,114) = 3.19, p < .05, 2  = .053. with the Dunnett’s t-test showing that 
performance in the gain condition was lower than the control and this effect just reached 
statistical significance, t(86) = 1.96, p =.053, CI = -.0001 - .135, whereas performance in the loss 
condition was significantly worse than performance in the control condition, t(66) = 2.54, p < 
.05, CI = .019 - .160. For the older adults, the main effect of incentive was also significant, 
F(2,166) = 4.53, p < .05, 2  = .052, with Dunnett’s t-test showing that performance in the gain 
condition was numerically but not statistically lower than the control condition, t(115) = 1.72, p 
= .09, CI = -.006 - .091, whereas performance in the loss condition was significantly worse than 
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performance in the control condition, t(107) = 2.83, p < .01, CI = .025 - .137. The targeted 
analyses result for older adults were in fact consistent with our previous study. 
 As outlined in the analysis section, we also compared the performance of the control 
participants to the incentivized runs of participants in the experimental (loss and gain) groups. 
This analysis yielded similar results to the overall ANOVA for this hypothesis, and thus 
provided converging evidence.  The experimental conditions significantly decreased 
performance for both young and older adults, F(2, 280) = 4.74, p < .01, 2  = .033, with the 
Dunnett’s t-test showing that performance in the control condition was significantly better than 
the gain as well as loss conditions t(203) = 2.01, p <.01, CI = .001 - .083, t(175) = 3.07, p <.01, 
CI = .025 - .114, respectively, while performances in gain and loss conditions were similar, 
t(188) = 1.21, p =.227, CI = - .017 - .073.   
 
2. As predicted, older adults report lower rates of subjective inattention for both traits (PAC 
scores) and state (post-task questionnaire) measures. 
For the PAC measures of trait inattention, consistent with the previous findings 
(Giambra, 1993; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Maillet & Schacter, 2016), older adults reported lower 
rates of mind-wandering, boredom, and distraction in everyday life than young adults did, for 
mind-wandering, F(1, 280) = 32.64, p < .001, 2  > .10; boredom, F(1, 280) = 46.60, p < .001, 2  
> .14; distractibility,  F(1, 280) = 41.77, p < .001, 2  > .13.  
 The results for the state (task-related) attention measures were similar to those of trait 
measures (PAC). Older adults reported lower level of inattention compared to younger adults, for 
mind-wandering, F(1, 280) = 97.86, p < .001, 2  > .26; boredom, F(1, 280) = 100.57, p < .001, 2  
> .26; distractibility,  F(1, 280) = 36.50, p < .001, 2  > .12. 
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3. Self-reported state inattention negatively correlated with CTET performance, while state 
motivation positively correlated with CTET performance.  
 Replicating results from previous studies (Berry et al., 2014a; Berry et al., 2014b), we 
found participants’ self-reported mind-wandering, boredom, and distractibility negatively 
correlated with their CTET overall performance (See table 2). As expected, state motivation was 
positively correlated with CTET overall performance, suggesting that participants who reported 
higher level of motivation performed better in the task. For correlations between trait inattention 
and CTET performance, we found significant negative correlation between boredom and overall 
CTET performance, but not for mind-wandering.  The correlation between trait distractibility and 
CTET performance was in the same direction as previous experiments, but did not reach 
significance.  
 Since the previous studies did not include a monetary incentive manipulation, we also 
examined correlations within our control groups. The findings for state inattention measures 
were consistent, but none of the trait correlations reached statistical significance.  
 These findings are partially consistent with our original hypothesis, except that trait 
mind-wandering did not correlate with task performance in the present study.  
 
 
Table III-2 Correlations between self-reported measures and performance. 
Correlations between the self-reported “state” (SAMQ scores) and “trait” (PAC scores) and attention 
measures and CTET performance. ** indicates p < .005 
 
 
 
State Attention and Motivation 
Questionnaire  
(SAMQ) 
Self-reported Everyday 
Attention Measure  
(PAC) 
Incentive 
Condition
s   
Mind-
wanderin
g 
boredo
m 
distracti
-bility 
Motivat
ion 
Mind-
wanderi
ng 
boredo
m 
distracti
-bility 
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 Control 
(n = 96) 
CTET  
Overall 
r -.323 -.353 -.370 351 -.10 -.114 -.109 
p ** ** ** ** .352 .268 .292 
 Gain 
(n = 109) 
CTET  
Overall 
r -.376 -.284 -.077 .096 -147 -.261 -.264 
p ** ** 425 .320 .126 .006 .006 
 Loss 
(n = 81) 
CTET 
Overall 
r -.239 -.212 .024 .103 -.018 .009 .070 
p .032 .058 830 .359 .837 .939 .533 
Overall CTET  
Overall 
r -.328 -.293 -.151 .271 -.09 -.148 -.105 
(n = 286) p ** ** .011 ** .128 .012 .075 
 
4. Statistically controlling for subjective mind-wandering eliminated age effects but not incentive 
condition effects on performance, while statistically controlling for subjective motivation 
eliminated incentive condition effects but not age effects on performance 
As reported from the previous section, for all incentive conditions, older adults reported 
less mind-wandering during the task compared to young adults, and participants’ mind-
wandering ratings correlated with their CTET performance, r = .33, p < .001.  Therefore, we next 
asked whether those subjective differences in mind-wandering might account for the age effects 
we found on task performance.  To test Hypothesis 4, we repeated the CTET ANOVA analyses, 
including ratings of mind-wandering during the task as a covariate (See Table 8.1 for full 
results).  In the analysis including Age, the effect of the mind-wandering covariate was 
significant, F(1, 279) = 23.23, p < .001, 2  = .077, and the previously-observed Age main effect 
as well as the Age X Time interaction was eliminated, both F < 1.  These results suggest that the 
higher ratings in mind-wandering may account for young adults’ poor performance.  
 To follow-up with the analysis above, we ran an additional ANCOVA, this time 
including ratings of motivation during the task as a covariate (See Table 9.1 for full results). As 
reported earlier, ratings of motivation during the task was positively correlated with participants’ 
task performance, r = .27, p<.001. We used this analysis to explore whether those subjective 
differences in motivation might account for the effect of incentive we found on task 
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performance. Results revealed a significant main effect of motivation as a covariate, F(1, 279) = 
23.27, p < .001, 2  = .077. The main effect of incentive condition, significant in the original 
ANOVA, was no longer significant, F <1; the Incentive X Time interaction was also eliminated, 
F < 1. These results suggest that participants’ self-reported motivation accounted for their 
performance differences across different incentive conditions. 
Temporal dynamic incentive effects 
1. The detrimental effect of incentives was “carried over” to non-incentivized runs, but this effect 
was similar for both gain and loss conditions.   
 We had originally hypothesized that compared to the gain condition, loss would have a 
greater global effect, and this effect would differ between older and younger adults. However, 
we found a detrimental global effect across age groups and incentive condition. 
The main effect of incentive condition was significant, F(2, 280) = 9.93, p < .001, 2  = 
.066. the follow-up Dunnett’s t tests showed that participants in the control condition performed 
significantly better than participants during non-incentivized runs in the gain as well as loss 
conditions, t(203) = 3.24, p < .001, CI =  .027 - .110; t(175) = 4.22, p < .001, CI =  .050 - .149, 
respectively. Partially consistent with our original hypothesis that we would find a global effect, 
these findings suggest that the detrimental effect of incentive was “carried over” to non-
incentivized runs, and thus a general context effect was evident. However, this context effect did 
not differ between gain and loss conditions, t(188) = 1.16, p = .248, CI =  -.018 - .071. Nor did 
this effect differ for age group, F < 1.  
 
2. When monetary incentives are offered, attentional focus is better in runs with incentives than 
runs without. 
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As predicted, we found a local effect of monetary incentive. The interaction between run 
type and incentive conditions was significant, F(2, 280) = 7.68, p < .01, 2  = .052.  While 
attentional performance was similar in alternating runs in the control conditions, t <1, 
performance in incentivized runs was better than that of non-incentivized runs in gain and loss 
conditions, t(108) = 4.10, p < .001, CI = - .034 - -.012; t(80) = 3.46, p < .001, CI = - .035 - -.009, 
respectively. None of the other interactions involving run type reached statistical significance.  
Consistent with our original hypothesis, we found that within-subjects, attentional 
performance was better in incentivized runs compared to non-incentivized runs. However, we 
did not find evidence of valence or age differences in these effects as predicted in our secondary 
hypothesis.   
 
3. Compared to young adults, older adults had higher rates of intrinsic motivation, and they also 
showed larger reduction of self-reported motivation in experimental conditions compared to the 
control condition. 
 We predicted that older adults would show higher rates of intrinsic motivation compared 
to young adults. According to SDT, the highly intrinsically motivated individuals would be more 
negatively impacted by extrinsic motivation, and thus we also predicted that older adults would 
show a larger reduction of self-reported motivation in experimental conditions compared to 
control.  As predicted, compared to young adults, older adults reported a higher level of intrinsic 
motivation. They reported significantly higher enjoyment, competence, and choice, and lower 
pressure when compared to young adults, F(1, 280) = 83.02, p < .001, 2  = .229, F(1, 280) = 
22.04, p < .001, 2  = .073, F(1, 280) = 14.44, p < .001, 2  = .049, F(1, 280) = 12.10, p < .01, 2  
= .041, respectively (See Table 3 in Supplemental Materials for means and standard deviations). 
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The main effect of Incentive Condition was significant only for competence, F(2, 280) = 4.18, p 
< .05, 2  = .029, but not other dimensions, all F < 2.15, p > .118. Follow-up Dunnett’s t tests 
showed that participants in the control condition reported significantly higher competence than 
participants in the gain condition, t(203) = 2.81, p < .01, CI =  .178 - 1.01,  The competence 
ratings for control participants were numerically higher but not significantly different compared 
to the loss condition, t(175) = 1.64, p = .102, CI =  -.077 - .842. There were no effects of Age X 
Incentive interactions on any of the dimensions of IMI, all F < 1.91. 
 For self-reported motivation during the task, older adults also showed a larger reduction 
during the experimental conditions compared to the control condition relative to young adults 
(see Figure 3) and these effects were also confirmed quantitatively.. We conducted an Age x 
Incentive Condition ANOVA on participants’ self-reported motivation. The age x incentive 
condition interaction was significant, F(2, 280)=25.76, p< .001, 2  = .155. For each age group, 
we conducted a follow-up ANOVA with the between-subjects factor Incentive and the within-
subject factors Run Type and Time, and used post-hoc two-sided Dunnett’s t-tests to compare 
the control condition to each incentive condition. For young adults, the main effect of Incentive 
was significant, F(2, 114)=3.532, p< .05, 2  = .058, with the Dunnett’s t-test showing that 
performance in the gain condition was numerically but not statistically lower than the control 
condition (p =.117, CI = -.843 - .078), whereas performance in the loss condition was 
significantly worse than performance in the control condition (p = .022, CI = -1.129 - -.076). For 
older adults, the main effect of Incentive was significant, F(2, 166)=97.12, p< .001, 2  = .539, 
with the Dunnett’s t-test showing that performance in both gain and loss condition were 
significantly lower than the control condition (p < .001, CI = -2.649 - -1.814, p<.001, CI = -2.79 
- -1.928).  
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 Our results confirmed that older adults were more intrinsically motivated than younger 
adults. Compared to young adults, they showed a larger reduction of motivation during the task 
during the experimental conditions compared to the control condition. These results are 
consistent with the interpretation that extrinsic incentives are more detrimental to those who are 
highly intrinsically motivated. 
  
4． Subjective mind-wandering and boredom were reduced during non-incentivized runs 
compared to incentivized runs. These reductions were larger for young adults compared to older 
adults.  
Consistent with our predictions, in both gain and loss conditions, participants reported 
less mind-wandering and boredom during incentivized runs compared to non-incentivized runs, 
for mind-wandering, F(1, 186) = 13.28, p < .001, 2  > .07 ; boredom, F(1, 186) = 31.89, p < 
.001, 2  > .15. Moreover, the Age group x Run Type interactions were significant across these 
measures such that young adults showed a larger effect of run type than that of older adults, for 
mind-wandering, F(1, 186) = 6.65, p < .05, 2  > .04; boredom, F(1, 186) = 9.55, p < .001, 2  > 
.05; distractibility,  F(1, 186) = 11.40, p < .001, 2  > .06. Since the incentive and non-
incentivized runs were alternating, data from the control condition were analyzed in the same 
manner to test if there were order effects. This was not the case: In the control condition, 
participants reported similar levels of inattention in alternating runs. These results suggest that 
the absence of monetary incentives increased participants’ level of mind-wandering and boredom 
during the task and these increases were larger for young adults than for older adults.  
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5. Participants reported higher levels of motivation as well as distractibility during incentivized 
runs than non-incentivized runs. The distractor effect was larger for younger adults than for older 
adults. 
As predicted, participants reported higher motivation during incentivized runs compared 
to non-incentivized, F(1, 188) = 49.88, p < .001, 2  = .211. Self-reported distractibility was also 
higher during incentivized runs compared to non-incentivized, F(1, 188) = 22.44, p < .001, 2  = 
.17, suggesting that participants were more distracted during incentivized runs compared to non-
incentivized runs.  For self-reported distractibility, the interaction between Age and Run Type 
was significant, F(1,186) = 11.40, p <.01, 2  = 058, suggesting that young adults found extrinsic 
incentive more distracting compared to older adults. 
As an exploratory analysis, we also tested the relationship between state motivation and 
distractibility as a function of incentive condition. While for the control condition, distractibility 
negatively correlated with motivation, r = -.560, p <.001, distractibility was positively correlated 
with motivation in the gain and loss conditions, r = .543, p <.001, r = .704, p <.001. In the 
control condition, participants who reported feedback as more distracting reported lower 
motivation. For the gain and loss conditions, participants who found motivation more distracting 
also reported higher rates of motivation. These results together with the CTET results suggest 
that the monetary incentives may be distracting and may contribute to reduced performance 
during the experimental conditions.  
 
6. For gain and loss conditions, participants’ extrinsic motivation positively correlated with 
performance reduction between incentive vs non-incentivized runs. 
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The results are consistent with our hypothesis. For the gain condition, participants’ state 
motivation was positively correlated with the performance difference between incentivized runs 
and non-incentivized runs, r = .243, p < .05. The same relationship was found in the loss 
condition, r = .285, p < .05. As predicted, this relationship was not significant in the control 
condition r = -.008, p = .937. Note that there were no incentivized runs in the control condition. 
The performance difference in the control group was a “dummy comparison” and the score was 
calculated by the average difference between alternating runs. 
 
Discussion 
A central aim of the present study was to replicate findings from the previous study in 
Chapter II. As predicted, older adults showed a decrease in performance in the loss condition 
compared to the control condition.  We also replicated the common findings that older adults 
report lower rates of mind-wandering, boredom, and distractibility both in daily life and during 
the task compared to young adults (in addition to Chapter II, see Giambra, 1993; Jackson & 
Balota, 2012; Maillet & Schacter, 2016). Furthermore, we generally replicated the relationships 
between CTET performance and self-reported measures that have now been found in several 
different studies in our laboratory (Berry, Demeter, et al., 2014; Berry, Li, et al., 2014; Kim et 
al., 2017).   
 There were also several unexpected findings, including some that contradicted our initial 
hypotheses and stand in contrast to the findings that Chapter II reported.  Of particular interest is 
that, both younger and older adults in the incentive groups showed worse performance than did 
those in the control condition. Moreover, older adults generally outperformed young adults, and 
young adults also were more sensitive to time-on-task decline.  Of course, one possible 
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explanation is that our earlier results of age-related differences were not reliable.  However, 
based on targeted analyses, another possibility is that the major conceptual conclusions in 
Chapter II still have merit, but that the within-subjects manipulation alters how participants, 
especially young adults, respond to the incentive, and this also has carryover effects to the non-
incentivized runs. 
 Although the Age X Incentive interaction did not reach statistical significance, targeted 
analyses within each age group revealed that for the older adults, participants in the control 
group performed better than participants in the loss group did on either incentivized or non-
incentivized runs. Meanwhile, the results for the control group and the gain-incentive group did 
not differ regardless of the run type (incentivized versus non-incentivized) that was used for 
comparison.  These results resemble those of Chapter 2, where the gain condition also 
demonstrated an intermediate effect between the control and loss condition for the older adults.    
The unexpected result for Incentive condition was the main effect of the Incentive 
condition for young adults.  In contrast to the results for older adults, for young adults the 
valence (gain versus loss) seemed to have less of an impact. Instead, the presence or absence of 
within-subjects incentive may have played a larger role. Specifically, for young adults in both the 
gain and loss conditions, performance in the incentivized runs did not significantly differ from 
that of participants in the control condition, whereas performance in the non-incentivized runs 
(again, regardless of valence) was significantly worse than that of the control participants.  One 
potential interpretation of this pattern is that young adults may experience a decrease in 
motivation and attention in non-incentivized runs when they are tested in the context of other 
incentivized runs. 
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With regard to the mechanisms for observed performance effects, the questionnaire data 
provide suggestions that are interesting, though admittedly tentative. First, boredom and 
distractibility tended to greater among the incentivized groups. These results were consistent 
with findings from previous studies on extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in which participants 
engaged less in a task after an incentive ended (Deci & Ryan, 1985). This reduced engagement 
was thought to result from a reduction in intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999, 
2001; Lepper, Henderlong, & Gingras, 1999). In our study, incentivized and non-incentivized 
runs were conducted in an alternating order. The predictable timing of incentives may contribute 
to the increased boredom during non-incentivized runs, as participants already knew those runs 
were non-incentivized. Second, the older adults in the incentivized groups generally reported less 
motivation compared to those in the control group. In contrast, for young adults, the 
questionnaire results suggest that they may have been distracted by thoughts about the incentive 
(or lack thereof on non-incentivized runs). 
Rather than viewing the above explanations as definitive conclusion, they should be 
considered tentative hypotheses that warrant more direct testing in future studies. Admittedly, in 
some ways, the results of the present study raise more questions than they answer. However, they 
highlight several potential factors that may not receive sufficient attention in the current 
literature about the effects of incentives on attention and cognitive control, or about age-related 
differences in that regard. Most importantly, they indicate that although incentives have 
beneficial effects on performance within subjects, they may have quite different, and perhaps 
even detrimental, effects between subjects. Between-subjects, incentives may actually decrease 
motivation, especially for older adults, and increase distractibility and mind-wandering about the 
incentive itself, with this latter effect potentially playing a larger role for young adults. When 
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varied within-subjects, the presence of an incentive on some runs may actually decrease 
motivation on non-incentivized runs, rather than “increasing” motivation per se – an 
interpretation that drastically differs from the dominant interpretation in the literature.  
Understanding the mechanisms that underlie these different effects will require further testing 
and studies that are designed specifically to test the hypotheses that have emerged from the 
current results. Nevertheless, documenting this discrepancy may already be a valuable 
contribution and caveat to the literature on the effects of incentive on motivation, attention, and 
cognitive control. 
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Appendix  B.  
Additional results from main-text experiment 
Table III-3 CTET performance for each group. 
Means and confidence intervals for attentional performance in each group (hits, false alarm, and d’) 
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Table III-4 Means and standard deviations for state subjective attention and motivation. 
  
Young 
Control       
(n = 49) 
Young 
Gain       (n 
= 49) 
Young 
Loss         
(n = 29) 
Old 
Control       
(n = 57) 
Old  Gain            
(n = 60) 
Old  Loss             
(n = 52) 
  I Non-I I 
Non-
I I 
Non
-I I 
Non
-I I 
Non
-I I 
Non
-I 
1. At times of this task, it was hard for me to keep my mind from wandering. 
  mean 3.19 3.14 
3.2
2 3.43 
3.4
9 3.73 
2.2
6 2.38 
2.4
3 2.42 
2.2
2 2.24 
  SD 1.02 1.00 
0.9
4 0.88 
0.8
9 0.75 
0.9
5 0.99 
1.0
1 1.01 
0.8
7 0.87 
2. (reverse scored) During the task, my thoughts seldom drifted from the subject before 
me. 
  mean 3.28 3.35 
3.5
7 3.80 
3.3
7 3.68 
3.0
4 3.04 
2.9
9 2.91 
3.0
1 3.06 
  SD 1.05 0.93 
0.7
8 0.72 
0.8
8 0.74 
1.1
2 1.05 
0.9
7 0.97 
0.9
6 0.90 
3. I was easily bored during this task. 
  mean 3.27 3.35 
3.4
2 3.71 
3.5
0 3.74 
2.1
2 2.11 
2.3
3 2.42 
2.2
4 2.30 
  SD 1.04 1.00 
0.9
8 0.92 
1.0
7 0.99 
1.0
7 1.05 
1.1
4 1.15 
0.9
8 0.99 
4. I had difficulty in keeping my attention focused on this long, tedious task. 
  mean 3.21 3.28 
3.3
9 3.65 
3.6
2 3.78 
2.2
2 2.31 
2.4
8 2.46 
2.3
2 2.41 
  SD 0.91 0.93 
0.9
0 0.80 
0.8
6 0.86 
0.9
4 1.04 
1.0
4 1.09 
0.9
1 0.98 
5. I found the feedback to be distracting. (Control) 
    I found the possibility of wining/losing money to be distracting. (I) 
    I found that thinking that I would not win/lose money on this run to be distracting. 
(Non-I) 
  mean 1.88 1.90 
2.2
2 1.93 
2.4
3 1.73 
1.3
9 1.44 
1.6
3 1.46 
1.5
3 1.45 
  SD 0.87 0.93 
0.9
8 0.82 
1.0
2 0.89 
0.5
7 0.70 
0.8
2 0.65 
0.6
6 0.67 
6. I found the feedback to be motivating. (Control) 
    I found the possibility of winning/losing money to be motivating. (I) 
    I found thinking I would not win/lose money on this run to be demotivating. (Non-I) 
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  mean 3.28 3.23 
3.2
2 2.52 
2.8
0 2.50 
3.9
3 4.06 
1.9
8 1.54 
1.7
3 1.53 
  SD 0.97 1.08 
0.9
2 1.01 
1.1
1 1.22 
1.2
6 1.22 
1.1
3 0.79 
0.9
5 0.81 
 
  
 
Table III-5 Means and standard deviations for Intrinsic Motivation Inventory. 
IMI items  
 
Young Adults Older Adults 
 Control Gain Loss Control Gain Loss 
Enjoyment Mean 2.35 2.48 2.34 4.08 3.97 3.80 
SD 1.09 1.35 1.18 1.63 1.48 1.41 
Competence Mean 4.03 3.23 3.26 4.56 4.18 4.36 
SD 1.34 1.84 1.72 1.41 1.22 1.57 
Choice Mean 5.41 5.46 5.37 6.07 6.05 5.65 
SD .763 1.06 1.26 .884 1.12 1.38 
Pressure/Tension Mean 3.04 3.51 3.57 2.65 2.78 2.95 
SD 1.28 1.47 1.64 1.40 1.25 1.21 
 
 
Table III-6 Summary of the Age X Incentive Type X Run Type  X Time X Run Order ANOVA on hit 
rates results. 
Summary of the Age (between-subjects: young, old) X Incentive Type (between-subjects: loss, gain) X 
Run Type (within-subjects: non-incentivized, incentivized) X Time (within-subjects: minute 1-4) X Run 
Order (between-subjects; incentivized first, non-incentive first) ANOVA on hit rates results for CTET.  
Results for the Time factor and interactions involving it use the linear trend analysis. 
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Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2p   
Age .991 1 5.58* .019 .030 
Incentive .308 1 1.73 .19 .009 
Run Order .011 1 .060 .806 .000 
A x I .021 1 .121 .729 .001 
A x RO .155 1 .871 .352 .005 
I x RO .217 1 1.22 .270 .007 
A x I x RO .415 1 2.34 .128 .013 
Error 32.33 182    
Time 4.12 1 284.45** < .001 .610 
T x A .057 1 3.92* .049 .021 
T x I .000 1 .004 .947 .000 
T x RO .030 1 2.09 .150 .011 
T x A x I .003 1 .189 .664 .001 
T x A x RO .008 1 .546 .461 .003 
T x I x RO .001 1 .047 .828 .000 
T x A x I x 
RO 
.012 1 .832 .363 .005 
Error 
(time) 
2.64 182    
Run Type .195 1 29.86** <.001 .141 
R x A .013 1 2.05 .154 .011 
R x I .000 1 .068 .795 .000 
R x RO .008 1 1.27 .262 .007 
R x A x I .015 1 2.32 .129 .013 
R x A x 
RO 
.001 1 .149 .700 .001 
R x I x RO .005 1 .726 .395 .004 
R x A x I x 
RO 
.000 1 .060 .807 .000 
Error   
(Run Type) 
1.19 182    
R x T .019 1 2.96  .087 .016 
R x T x A .000 1 .001 .980 .000 
R x T x I .001 1 .221 .638 .001 
R x T x RO .003 1 .471 .494 .003 
R x T x A 
x I 
.006 1 .957 .329 .005 
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R x T x A 
x RO 
.001 1 .222 .638 .001 
R x T x I x 
RO 
.000 1 .000 .987 .000 
R x T x A 
x I x RO 
.005 1 .803 .371 .004 
Error       
(R x T) 
1.20 182    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
 
 
Table III-7 Summary of the Age X Incentive Type X Run Type  X Time X Run Order ANOVA on d' 
results. 
Summary of the Age (between-subjects: young, old) X Incentive Type (between-subjects: loss, gain) X 
Run Type (within-subjects: non-incentivized, incentivized) X Time (within-subjects: minute 1-4) X Run 
Order (between-subjects; incentivized first, non-incentive first) ANOVA on d’ results for CTET.  Results 
for the Time factor and interactions involving it use the linear trend analysis. 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2p   
Age 1.63 1 .409 .523 .002 
Incentive 14.03 1 3.52 .062 .019 
Run Order 2.72 1 .569 .451 .003 
A x I 1.58 1 .396 .530 .002 
A x RO 4.07 1 1.02 .328 .005 
I x RO 3.85 1 .964 .328 .005 
A x I x RO .881 1 .221 .639 .001 
Error 726.00 182    
Time 45.89 1 200.65** < .001 .524 
T x A 1.33 1 5.82* .017 .031 
T x I .000 1 .000 .999 .000 
T x RO .336 1 1.47 .227 .008 
T x A x I .116 1 .507 .477 .003 
T x A x RO .002 1 .007 .935 .000 
T x I x RO .496 1 2.17 .143 .012 
T x A x I x 
RO 
.382 1 1.67 .198 .009 
Error 
(time) 
41.62 182    
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Run Type 4.53 1 26.02** <.001 .125 
R x A .413 1 2.37 .125 .013 
R x I .007 1 .041 .840 .000 
R x RO 4.28 1 24.60** <.001 .119 
R x A x I .097 1 .560 .455 .003 
R x A x 
RO 
.046 1 .267 .606 .001 
R x I x RO .043 1 .248 .619 .001 
R x A x I x 
RO 
.050 1 .288 .592 .002 
Error   
(Run Type) 
31.68 182    
R x T .130 1 .873  .351 .005 
R x T x A .003 1 .021 .884 .000 
R x T x I .198 1 1.33 .251 .007 
R x T x RO .067 1 .448 .504 .002 
R x T x A 
x I 
.063 1 .424 .516 .002 
R x T x A 
x RO 
.131 1 .879 .350 .005 
R x T x I x 
RO 
.006 1 .041 .840 .000 
R x T x A 
x I x RO 
.037 1 .246 .620 .001 
Error       
(R x T) 
27.11 182    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
 
 
Table III-8 Summary of the Age X Incentive Type X Run Type X Time ANOVA on hit rates results. 
Summary of the Age (between-subjects: young, old) X Incentive Type (between-subjects: loss, gain) X 
Run Type (within-subjects: non-incentivized, incentivized) X Time (within-subjects: minute 1-4) 
ANOVA on hit rates results for CTET (Hypothesis 1 for Replication).  Results for the Time factor and 
interactions involving it use the linear trend analysis. 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2p   
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Age 1.27 1 7.53** .006 .026 
Incentive 2.47 2 7.32** .001 .050 
A x I .065 2 .194 .824 .001 
Error 47.19 280    
Time 5.19 1 392.10** < .001 .583 
T x A .104 1 7.86** .005 .027 
T x I .112 2 4.23* .016 .029 
T x A x I .006 2 .230 .794 .002 
Error 
(time) 
3.71 280    
Run Type .104 1 15.65** < .001 .053 
R x A .002 1 .325 .569 .001 
R x I .102 2 7.68** <.001 .052 
R x A x I .035 2 2.65 .072 .019 
Error   
(Run Type) 
1.86 280    
R x T .011 1 1.87 .173 .007 
R x T x A .000 1 .002 .962  .000 
R x T x I .014 2 1.18 .309 .008 
R x T x A 
x I 
.006 2 .507 .603 .004 
Error (R x 
T) 
1.62 280    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
 
 
Table III-9 Summary of the Age X Incentive Type X Run Type X Time ANOVA on d' results. 
Summary of the Age (between-subjects: young, old) X Incentive Type (between-subjects: loss, gain) X 
Run Type (within-subjects: non-incentivized, incentivized) X Time (within-subjects: minute 1-4) 
ANOVA on d’ results for CTET (Hypothesis 1 for Replication).  Results for the Time factor and 
interactions involving it use the linear trend analysis. 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2p   
Age 2.60 1 .667 .415 .002 
Incentive 56.49 2 7.25** .001 .049 
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A x I 1.414 2 .182 .834 .001 
Error 1090.62 280    
Time 63.63 1 268.21** < .001 .489 
T x A 1.81 1 7.64** .006 .027 
T x I .356 2 .749 .474 .005 
T x A x I .133 2 .281 .755 .002 
Error 
(time) 
66.43 280    
Run Type 1.052 1 5.71*  .018 .020 
R x A .399 1 2.17 .142 .008 
R x I 5.22 2 14.18** <.001 .092 
R x A x I .120 2 .325 .723 .009 
Error   
(Run Type) 
51.59 280    
R x T .114 1 .812 .368 .003 
R x T x A .000 1 .000 .994  .000 
R x T x I .234 2 .832 .436 .006 
R x T x A 
x I 
.074 2 .262 .770 .002 
Error (R x 
T) 
39.44 280    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
 
 
Table III-10 Summary of targeted analysis for young adults (hit rates). 
Incentive Type (between-subjects: loss, gain) X X Run Type (within-subjects; incentivized, non-
incentive) X Time (within-subjects: minute 1-4) ANOVA on hit rates results for CTET (Hypothesis 1 for 
Replication).  Results for the Time factor and interactions involving it use the linear trend analysis. 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2p   
Incentive 1.22 2 3.19* .045 .053 
Error 21.83 114    
T 2.81 1 247.25** <.001 .684 
T x I .035 2 1.53 .221 .026 
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Error 
(time) 
1.30 114    
Run Type .057 1 6.95*  .01 .057 
R x I .102 2 6.24 .003 .099 
Error   
(Run Type) 
.930 114    
R x T .004 1 .710 .401 .006 
R x T x I .005 2 .426 .654 .007 
Error (R x 
T) 
.671 114    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
 
 
Table III-11 Summary of targeted analysis for young adults (d'). 
Incentive Type (between-subjects: loss, gain) X X Run Type (within-subjects; incentivized, non-
incentive) X Time (within-subjects: minute 1-4) ANOVA on d’ results for CTET (Hypothesis 1 for 
Replication).  Results for the Time factor and interactions involving it use the linear trend analysis. 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2p   
Incentive 26.75 2 3.853* .024 .063 
Error 395.732 114    
T 36.15 1 185.52** <.001 .619 
T x I .211 2 .543 .583 .009 
Error 
(time) 
22.21 114    
Run Type 1.14 1 5.84*  .017 .049 
R x I 2.76 2 7.05** .001 .110 
Error   
(Run Type) 
22.315 114    
R x T .048 1 .361 .549 .003 
R x T x I .019 2 .073 .930 .001 
Error (R x 
T) 
15.28 114    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
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Table III-12 Summary of targeted analysis for older adults (hit rates). 
Incentive Type (between-subjects: loss, gain) X X Run Type (within-subjects; incentivized, non-
incentive) X Time (within-subjects: minute 1-4) ANOVA on hit rates results for CTET (Hypothesis 1 for 
Replication).  Results for the Time factor and interactions involving it use the linear trend analysis. 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2p   
Incentive 1.39 2 4.53* .012 .052 
Error 25.37 166    
T 2.40 1 165.14** <.001 .499 
T x I .092 2 3.16 .045 .037 
Error 
(time) 
2.41 166    
Run Type .048 1 8.51**  .004 .049 
R x I .026 2 2.32 .102 .027 
Error   
(Run Type) 
.932 166    
R x T .007 1 1.27 .261 .008 
R x T x I .016 2 1.37 .256 .016 
Error (R x 
T) 
.944 166    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
 
 
Table III-13 Summary of targeted analysis for older adults (d'). 
Summary of targeted analysis for older adults, Incentive Type (between-subjects: loss, gain) X X Run 
Type (within-subjects; incentivized, non-incentive) X Time (within-subjects: minute 1-4) ANOVA on d’ 
results for CTET (Hypothesis 1 for Replication).  Results for the Time factor and interactions involving it 
use the linear trend analysis. 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2p   
Incentive 31.84 2 3.803* .024 .044 
Error 694.89 166    
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T 27.56 1 103.45** <.001 .384 
T x I .266 2 .499 .608 .006 
Error 
(time) 
44.21 166    
Run Type .097 1 .552  .459 .003 
R x I 2.64 2 7.48** .001 .083 
Error   
(Run Type) 
29.273 166    
R x T .070 1 .484 .487 .003 
R x T x I .342 2 1.17 .312 .014 
Error (R x 
T) 
24.163 166    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
 
 
Table III-14 Summary of ANCOVA results (hit rates). 
Summary of Age Group (between-subjects: young, old) X Incentive Type (between-subjects: loss, gain) 
X Run Type (within-subjects; incentivized, non-incentive) X Time (within-subjects: minute 1-4) ANOVA 
on hit rates with Mind-Wandering as covariate results for CTET (Hypothesis 4 for Replication).  Results 
for the Time factor and interactions involving it use the linear trend analysis. 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2p   
Mind-
wandering 
3.63 1 23.23** <.001 .077 
Age .000 1 .000 .999 .000 
Incentive 1.75 2 5.61** .004 .039 
A x I .085 2 .273 .761 .002 
Error 43.56 279    
Time .112 1 8.80**  .003 .031 
T x MW .150 1 11.73** .001 .040 
T x A .007 1 .513 .474 .002 
T x I .080 2 3.14* .045 .022 
T x A x I .006 2 .240 .787 .002 
Error 
(time) 
3.56 279    
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Run Type .001 1 .127  .722 .000 
R x MW .005 1 .825 .364 .003 
R x A .000 1 .001 .977 .000 
R x I .095 2 7.12** .001 .049 
R x A x I .035 2 2.66 .072 .019 
Error   
(Run Type) 
1.86 279    
R x T .000 1 .034 .854 .000 
R x T x 
MW 
.002 1 .405 .525 .001 
R x T x A .001 1 .133 .716  .000 
R x T x I .012 2 1.06 .350 .008 
R x T x A 
x I 
.005 2 .469 .626 .003 
Error (R x 
T) 
1.61 279    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
 
 
Table III-15 Summary of ANCOVA results (d'). 
Summary of Age Group (between-subjects: young, old) X Incentive Type (between-subjects: loss, gain) 
X Run Type (within-subjects; incentivized, non-incentive) X Time (within-subjects: minute 1-4) ANOVA 
on d’ with Mind-Wandering as covariate results for CTET (Hypothesis 4 for Replication).  Results for the 
Time factor and interactions involving it use the linear trend analysis. 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2p   
Mind-
wandering 
33.49 1 8.84** .003 .031 
Age 2.43 1 .640 .424 .002 
Incentive 46.11 2 6.08** .003 .042 
A x I 0.803 2 .106 .899 .001 
Error 1057.13 279    
Time 1.12 1 4.88*  .028 .017 
T x MW 2.17 1 9.41** .002 .033 
T x A .168 1 .728 .394 .003 
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T x I .163 2 .354 .702 .003 
T x A x I .078 2 .170 .844 .001 
Error 
(time) 
64.26 279    
Run Type .001 1 .008  .931 .000 
R x MW .138 1 .750 .387 .003 
R x A .126 1 .682 .410 .002 
R x I 4.93 2 13.35** <.001 .087 
R x A x I .122 2 .330 .719 .002 
Error   
(Run Type) 
51.45 279    
R x T .091 1 .646 .422 .002 
R x T x 
MW 
.182 1 1.29 .256 .005 
R x T x A .046 1 .327 .568  .001 
R x T x I .219 2 .779 .460 .006 
R x T x A 
x I 
.068 2 .240 .787 .002 
Error (R x 
T) 
39.26 279    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
 
 
Table III-16 Summary of ANCOVA results (hit rates). 
Summary of Age Group (between-subjects: young, old) X Incentive Type (between-subjects: loss, gain) 
X Run Type (within-subjects; incentivized, non-incentive) X Time (within-subjects: minute 1-4) ANOVA 
on hit rates with Motivation as covariate results for CTET.  Results for the Time factor and interactions 
involving it use the linear trend analysis. 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2p   
Motivation 3.21 1 20.36** <.001 .068 
Age 2.25 1 14.27 <.001 .049 
Incentive .246 2 .781 .459 .006 
A x I .828 2 2.63 .074 .018 
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Error 43.99 279    
Time 1.30 1 101.69**  <.001 .267 
T x M .133 1 10.35** .001 .036 
T x A .157 1 12.24 .001 .042 
T x I .008 2 .299 .742 .002 
T x A x I .012 2 .479 .620 .003 
Error 
(time) 
3.58 279    
Run Type .002 1 .284  .594 .001 
R x M .028 1 4.26* .040 .015 
R x A .000 1 .009 .923 .000 
R x I .129 2 9.82** <.001 .066 
R x A x I .018 2 1.36 .257 .010 
Error   
(Run Type) 
1.84 279    
R x T .005 1 .867 .353 .003 
R x T x M .001 1 .232 .630 .001 
R x T x A .000 1 .004 .951  .000 
R x T x I .007 2 .624 .536 .004 
R x T x A 
x I 
.006 2 .504 .605 .004 
Error (R x 
T) 
1.61 279    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
 
 
Table III-17 Summary of ANCOVA results (d'). 
Summary of Age Group (between-subjects: young, old) X Incentive Type (between-subjects: loss, gain) 
X Run Type (within-subjects; incentivized, non-incentive) X Time (within-subjects: minute 1-4) ANOVA 
on d’ with Motivation as covariate results for CTET.  Results for the Time factor and interactions 
involving it use the linear trend analysis. 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2p   
Motivation 38.76 1 10.28** .002 .036 
Age 8.80 1 2.34 .128 .008 
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Incentive 14.91 2 1.98 .140 .014 
A x I 7.06 2 .936 .393 .007 
Error 1051.86 279    
Time 10.905 1 46.00**  <.001 .142 
T x M .285 1 1.20 .274 .004 
T x A 2.05 1 8.65** .004 .030 
T x I .045 2 .094 .910 .001 
T x A x I .181 2 .381 .684 .003 
Error 
(time) 
66.14 279    
Run Type .045 1 .244  .621 .001 
R x M .374 1 2.04 .155 .007 
R x A .229 1 1.25 .265 .004 
R x I 5.05 2 13.76** <.001 .090 
R x A x I .048 2 .130 .878 .001 
Error   
(Run Type) 
51.21 279    
R x T .070 1 .492 .483 .002 
R x T x M .024 1 .170 .681 .001 
R x T x A .001 1 .010 .921  .000 
R x T x I .209 2 .740 .478 .005 
R x T x A 
x I 
.059 2 .211 .810 .002 
Error (R x 
T) 
39.416 279    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
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Chapter IV. The Effect of Outcome Valence and Motivational Salience on Learning and 
Source Recognition 
 
Abstract 
We investigated explicit knowledge of learned value-based associations in a two-phase 
experiment. The effects of point and monetary incentives was also examined. Participants first 
learned to associate scenes with high or low probability (i.e., high or low motivational salience, 
respectively) win and loss by performing a value learning task in which the objective was to 
maximize points, or points and money earned on each trial. Contrary to the common assumption 
that win and loss outcome associations are learned equally, we found that win associations were 
learned better than loss associations, suggesting an advantage for outcomes with a positive 
valence. A subsequent source recognition task assessed explicit knowledge of the learned value 
associations. Regardless of learning level or incentive conditions, source recognition was 
superior for scenes that had previously been the optimal choice (high probability win and low 
probability loss) however, accurate recognition of optimal win scenes was significantly better 
than optimal loss scenes. These findings indicate that learning to select the optimal choice is 
dissociable from explicit knowledge about the outcome contingencies, especially for loss and 
low probability outcomes.  Moreover, motivational salience is represented differentially in 
explicit memory for win and loss outcomes.  
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Introduction 
The ability to predict if an action may lead to an advantageous or disadvantageous 
outcome is crucial for an individual to make decisions in complex environments. Such 
predictions are acquired through learning from past experiences. Actions resulting in a desirable 
outcome are more likely to be repeated in the future. Actions producing an aversive outcome, 
are more likely to be avoided. In complex environments, the relationships between actions and 
outcomes are often probabilistic rather than deterministic. Moreover, in order to make optimal 
decisions, individuals often need to integrate information from immediate outcomes as well as 
the history of outcomes produced by the same action. This type of decision is called a value-
based decision because the choice was made based on a subjective value. The process of 
updating the value based on outcomes is called value learning. Research on value learning has a 
long history dating back to animal research by Thorndike (1898), Pavlov (1927) and Tolman 
(1948). Before going into details about the present study, it is useful to clarify the concepts 
related to value and value learning.   
Value learning systems 
A multiple-system framework of value learning has been proposed based on both animal 
and human behavioral studies (Dickinson, 1985; Dickinson and Balleine, 2002), as well as 
neural and computational evidence (Balleine and O'Doherty, 2010; Balleine et al., 2009; Daw et 
al., 2005; Daw and O’Doherty, 2014; Rangel et al., 2008). This multiple-system framework 
entails three distinct types of value learning systems: Pavlovian, habitual, and goal-directed. 
These systems enable agents to make predictions based on prior experience and to make 
decisions in different circumstances. Although the precise neural mechanisms underlying these 
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systems are not yet fully specified, a large body of research has shown that behaviors from 
different learning systems are psychologically and computationally dissociable.  
 The Pavlovian system enables an agent to acquire associations between stimuli and 
outcomes. Once the association is established, the system activates simple approach and 
avoidance to particular stimuli. The classic example of Pavlovian learning comes from Pavlov 
(1927). When a neutral stimulus (bell) is repeatedly paired with an unconditioned stimulus 
(food), the neutral stimulus becomes a conditioned stimulus and elicits a conditioned response 
(salivation), which is the reflex (unconditioned) response to the unconditioned stimulus (food). 
There are two important differences between the Pavlovian system and other systems.  First, the 
association formed in Pavlovian learning is between the stimulus and the outcome rather than 
the action and the outcome. For example, the dog salivates because the bell predicted food, and 
it is the food that causes salvation. Second, the Pavlovian system assigns values to a small set of 
biologically significant events and thus is limited to a small repertoire of inflexible behaviors 
(Rangel et al., 2008). 
   Similar to the Pavlovian system, the habitual system assigns values to stimulus-
response associations.  However, a key difference between the habitual system and the 
Pavlovian system is that habitual associations are between the action and the outcome. In other 
words, the outcome causes the action in habitual learning. For example, if pressing a lever 
provides food, a rat can learn to press the lever through repeating this action to obtain food. 
Although the habitual system allows agents to learn many complex behaviors, this system is still 
inflexible. Habitual learning is a result of repetition and extensive training. It does not allow 
agents to flexibly adjust their actions.   
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 By contrast, the goal-directed system integrates causal consequences of specific actions. 
Dickinson (1985) argued that in goal-directed learning, agents learn to encode a representation 
of the action-outcome contingency and treat the outcome as an incentive or goal. In this type of 
learning, the system does not only assign values to actions associated with anticipated 
consequences, but also evaluates the rewards associated with outcomes. If the value of an 
outcome changes, the representation of the action-outcome contingency is modified and thus the 
system will update the value of an action. With the capacity of updating, agents can respond to 
environmental changes through goal-directed learning.  
 The present study examines value learning by what would be best characterized as the 
goal-directed system. However, it is also important to note that these three learning systems do 
not function in isolation and any given task is likely to involve multiple types of learning, 
especially in humans. The literature on how these learning systems interact and oppose one 
another is rich, complex (see an overview in O’Doherty, Cockburn, & Pauli, 2017) and beyond 
the scope and design of the current research.  
 
Prediction Error and Value Signal 
Both animal and human research has investigated the psychological, computational, and 
neural underpinnings of value-based decisions (see reviews Johnson & Ratcliff, 2014; Kable & 
Glimcher, 2009; Levy & Glimcher, 2012; Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). Studies by 
Schultz and colleagues (1997) provided initial evidence on the relationship between 
dopaminergic neurons and value signals. Their main findings were that the phasic activity of 
dopamine neurons encodes a prediction error (PE) — the difference between the actual reward 
from the outcome and the expected reward. PEs serve as a learning signal, allowing an agent to 
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improve the prediction by continuously updating those predictions toward what was actually 
experienced. A positive PE represents an actual outcome that is better than expected, and has 
been associated with increased phasic firing rates in the midbrain dopamine neurons. By 
contrast, a negative PE represents an actual outcome that is worse than expected and has been 
associated with cessation of firing in these dopamine neurons. Together, positive PEs reinforce 
the current action-outcome association, while for negative PEs, the association is weakened. In 
addition to midbrain components, many recent studies have revealed a complex brain network 
for value signals, including areas such as amygdala, orbital frontal cortex, ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex, striatum, lateral prefrontal, and parietal cortex (see O’Doherty et al., 2017). 
Behavioral and neural evidence also suggests that value signals incorporate different information 
such as valence (Seymour et al., 2007; Weller et al., 2007; Yacubian et al., 2006), predictiveness 
(motivational salience; Lang & Davis, 2006; Lin & Nicolelis, 2008), and delay between 
decisions and outcome (time discounting; Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’donoghue, 2002). These 
different aspects of value may have differential effects on different cognitive processes.   
 
Goal-directed value learning and cognition 
The essence of value learning is to associate an otherwise neutral stimulus with a value, 
allowing an agent to optimize behavior by learning to predict outcomes of actions. In laboratory 
settings, this type of learning has been studied by asking participants to perform a task in which 
they learn to associate stimuli with value information (e.g., valence, predictiveness of an 
outcome) until meeting a set performance criterion, which is typically achieved after an 
extensive series of exposures to the stimuli and their outcomes.  Researchers have designed and 
utilized a variety of paradigms to examine this learning process. These paradigms use a common 
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framework of maximizing gains and minimizing losses. In this framework, participants are 
expected to learn to choose the optimal choices: high probability gain and low probability loss. 
For example, Pessiglione and colleagues (2006) used a typical probabilistic learning task. 
Participants were asked to choose between novel two stimuli (abstract symbols) to maximize 
monetary payoff. Three pairs of stimuli were present: one pair of stimuli associated with gains, 
another associated with losses, and the final one associated with no financial outcome. The gain 
and loss stimuli were associated with a certain probability of the outcome. Participants learned 
to choose the high-probability gain and low probability loss after 30 trials.   
Many recent studies have focused on how stimuli that have acquired learned value 
influence different psychological constructs, such as perceptual processing (O’Brien & 
Raymond, 2012), attention (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011; Della Libera, & Chelazzi, 
2009; Raymond and O’Brien, 2009), motor control (Painter, Kritikos, & Raymond, 2013), 
working memory (Thomas, FitzGibbon, & Raymond, 2016) and associative memory (Aberg, 
Müller, & Schwartz, 2017).  A majority of these studies have taken a similar two-pronged 
approach: Stimuli from a prior value learning/value decision-making task are incorporated in a 
subsequent follow-up or secondary task to examine the consequences of prior learning.  These 
studies typically assume that participants have acquired value associations during the initial 
learning task and then make inferences about what was learned based on performance of the 
secondary task. For example, in a study by Raymond and O’Brien (2009), participants 
performed a value learning task (VLT) prior to an attentional blink task (ABT). In the VLT, 
participants chose between face stimuli and learned associations with wins or losses (valence) 
and high or low motivational salience. Valence and motivational salience are two distinct 
psychological dimensions. Valence refers to whether the outcome is positive (gain) or negative 
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(loss); motivational salience represents the outcome predictiveness of the stimuli, or the 
probability of obtaining an outcome by choosing a stimulus. After completion of the VLT, the 
learned face stimuli were presented again in the ABT in addition to a number of new face 
stimuli. Participants were required to distinguish if the faces were old (learned) or new. They 
found that recognition performance was better for faces associated with high rather than low 
motivational salience regardless of valence or attention constraints.  In addition, when 
attentional resources were constrained, recognition performance was reduced for faces 
associated with losses but there was no effect on faces associated with wins. Therefore, the 
authors concluded that while effects of motivational salience seem independent of attention, 
valence may affect attention. In this example, the effects of valence and motivational salience 
were learned from the first value learning task and they assessed by a secondary ABT task.  
  In addition to the study by Raymond and O’Brien (2009), many studies investigating 
value learning involved two aspects of assigned values: valence and motivational salience. 
Numerous studies have investigated the effects of these two dimensions and their interaction 
(e.g., O’Brien & Raymond, 2012; Painter, Kritikos, & Raymond, 2013; Raymond and O’Brien, 
2009). For example, using a value learning task similar to Raymond and O’Brien (2009), 
Rothkirch and colleagues (2013) investigated effects of valence and motivational salience on 
saccades. After the completion of a value learning task, participants performed a subsequent 
saccade task. The learned stimuli from the value learning task were presented in the secondary 
task. They found that saccadic latencies were shorter for previously learned stimuli associated 
with high versus low positive motivational salience.   
While these studies provided insights about how learned value may influence subsequent 
cognitive processes, they assume that the underlying learning is equivalent for all stimuli and 
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their associations if performance reaches criterion (e.g. learned to make optimal choices during 
the task). The finding that secondary task performance was affected by valence and motivational 
salience, even though the previously learned value of the stimuli was irrelevant, raises doubt 
about this assumption. An even more basic aspect of value learning has yet to be investigated: 
the assessment of explicit knowledge of the outcomes for each stimulus in the value learning 
phase. Prior studies have assumed equal learning and presumably equivalent knowledge of 
outcomes and their probabilities. The present study tests these assumptions directly.  
 
Present study 
The present study uses a value learning task similar to prior research; however, the 
secondary task is specifically designed to assess participants’ explicit knowledge of the learned 
associations. We combined the Value Learning Task (VLT) modified from Raymond and 
O’Brien (2009) with a Source Recognition Task (SRT). The valence and the motivational 
salience of the stimuli were experimentally manipulated in the VLT. In the SRT, participants 
were asked to perform a forced choice recognition judgment and the choices included 
information about both valence and motivational salience for each of the learned stimuli. This 
allowed us to assess participants’ explicit knowledge about the associations with the stimuli. In 
addition to participants’ correct responses, we also explored participants’ attribution errors.  
In addition to determining whether value learning and explicit knowledge of associations 
are affected by the real-world significance of the outcome, we randomly assigned participants 
into two groups: point incentive and monetary incentive. Participants in the point incentive 
group only received points and performance-contingent feedback while participants in the 
monetary incentive group received performance based monetary rewards in addition to points 
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and feedback. This manipulation provides insight into whether findings with artificial reward, 
such as points, can be generalizable to a real-world situation where outcomes have meaning, as 
they would when someone would gain or lose real money.  
In summary, the current study addressed the following research questions: 1) What do 
participants know (report explicitly via source recognition) about the associations acquired in 
the VLT? 2) How do valence and motivational salience of the learned stimuli affect 
participants’ explicit knowledge (source recognition)? 3) What are the types of errors 
participants make? How do these errors inform the representation of participants’ learned 
associations? 4) Does monetary incentive affect value learning? If so, what aspect of value 
learning is impacted? Does incentive also affect subsequent source recognition?   
 
Methods 
All methods, materials, and procedures were approved by the University of Michigan 
Institutional Review Board.  
Participants  
A total of 116 participants (56 female, mean age = 18.66) were recruited for this study. 
The target enrollment was 92. Group size was determined based on prior pilot work and counter-
balancing required by the task.  All participants were recruited from the Introductory Psychology 
subject pool at the University of Michigan and received course credits for their participation.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions: point incentive (N = 46, 22 
females, age range = 18 -21 years, mean age = 18.67 years) and monetary incentive conditions 
(N = 46, 23 females, age range = 18 -21 years, mean age = 18.76 years).  Participants in the 
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monetary incentive condition received a performance-based monetary reward in the VLT, while 
those in the point incentive condition received only feedback about points they earned.  
Participants were screened to ensure no history of anxiety, depression, ADHD, head injury, and 
no use of medications that affect cognition. For inclusion in the analyses, it was required that 
participants learn to a criterion of 65% accuracy for both win and loss conditions by the final 
block of the VLT.  Those who did not meet this criterion presumably failed to understand the 
instructions or engage sufficiently in the task and were excluded.  Seven participants were 
excluded for the monetary incentive condition and 17 participants were excluded for the point 
incentive condition.  The fact that more participants had to be excluded from the point incentive 
than monetary incentive condition might seem due to the effects of monetary incentives. This 
issue will be revisited in the result section. 
 
Apparatus   
The main tasks were implemented using E-Prime version 2.0 (Psychology Software tools; 
http://www.pstnet.com/eprime.cfm).  The apparatus used to run the tasks and record all 
necessary data was a Pentium 4 computer running E-Run version 2.0 on a 40 cm monitor (75-Hz 
refresh, 1152x864 resolution).  The viewing distance was 45 cm.  
 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were acquired from the Cognitive Neuroscience Research Lab led by Adam 
Gazzaley (Rissman, Gazzaley, & D’Esposito, 2009), and consisted of 18 grayscale images.   All 
images were novel photographs of landscape scenes, 225 pixels wide by 225 pixels tall.  
Procedure 
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Participants were randomly assigned to either the point incentive or monetary incentive 
conditions. All participants were instructed to earn as many points as possible in the value 
learning task and their cumulative score was presented on the upper right corner of the screen 
throughout the task.  In the monetary incentive condition, participants were told that they could 
earn a bonus up to $10 based on points earned.  Their bonus was predetermined to be 3% of their 
final score.  Participants in the point incentive condition were informed of their final point 
accrual but did not receive any monetary reward.  
 
Value Learning Task 
The VLT was modified based on the task by Raymond and O’Brien (2009).  The present 
task used 6 black and white scenes as stimuli while the original task used 12 faces.  On each 
trial, one scene appeared above a central fixation cross, and the other appeared below the cross 
(Figure 1a).  The participant was instructed to select one of the scenes by pressing either the “F” 
key to select the top scene or the “J” key to select the bottom scene.  The selection of a scene 
resulted in one of three outcomes: a win, loss or no change in points.  A win outcome earned the 
participant 5 points, a loss outcome took away 5 points, and a no change outcome left the score 
unchanged.  The goal of the task was to earn as many points as possible. 
One pair was randomly assigned to one of the three valence conditions: win, lose and 
control.  The win pair could result in a win or no change while the loss condition could result in a 
loss or no change.  The control condition always led to no change.  The assignment of scenes to 
value conditions was counterbalanced and randomized across participants.  
In addition to valence, the motivational salience of the outcome was also manipulated in 
the win and loss pairs.  One scene from each win or loss pair was associated with 80% 
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probability win or loss, and designated the high motivational salience scene.  When the 
participant chose the high motivational salience scene, 80% of the time he or she would receive 
a valence outcome (either win or loss) while the remaining 20% resulted in a no change 
outcome.  The other scene from each win or loss pair was associated with a 20% probability of 
win or loss; the low motivational salience scene. These contingencies remained constant for the 
entire experiment.  Therefore, it was to the participant’s advantage to learn to identify and select 
the high probability win scene for the win pair trials and the low probability loss scene for the 
loss trials.  Win, loss, and no-change scene pairs occurred randomly and with equal probability.  
In addition to the randomization previously defined, the program also randomized the scene 
top/bottom location for a given trial.  This reduced the effects of bias participants may have for 
preferring scenes in the top or bottom location.  
 The VLT was administered in a series of five blocks.  Participants were given a one-
minute break between blocks.  Each block contained 20 win trials, 20 loss trials, and 20 control 
trials, in a random order, for a total of 60 trials.  The motivational salience and location 
probabilities described earlier for the win and loss conditions pertained for every block (see 
Figure for an illustration of motivational salience and optimal choices for the VLT). 
For each trial in the VLT, participants were instructed to select the scene that yielded 
optimal outcomes for most possible points.  One scene pair appeared on each trial. Once a 
decision was indicated, a gold border appeared around the selected scene, followed by feedback 
about the selection.  The feedback phase presented a screen with Win (in green), Loss (in red), or 
No Change (in black) in the middle of the screen along with the participant’s cumulative point 
total in the upper right corner of the screen.   
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Source Recognition Task 
After completing the VLT, participants performed the Source Recognition Task (SRT) to 
evaluate their explicit memory for learned associations.  This task included the 6 scenes from 
the VLTs and 12 new scenes.  The 6 old scenes were presented 4 times each whereas the 12 new 
scenes were presented 2 times each, totaling 48 trials.  Participants were given 6 options for 
classifying each scene: very likely win, occasionally win, no change, very likely lose, 
occasionally lose, and none (new).  The “very likely” category corresponded with the high 
motivational salience (80%) scene while the “occasionally” category adjective represented the 
low motivational salience (20%) scene.  No feedback was given about performance on this task.  
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Figure IV-1. Diagram of the VLT. 
a. Participants viewed a pair of scenes, one above and one below a fixation cross. They chose a scene by 
pressing one of the two designated keys and a gold border appeared around the selected scene. The screen 
displayed the feedback and their score after their selection. In this example, a participant selected a 20% 
win scene and received a “No Change” feedback. b. The table illustrates the relationship between value 
conditions and motivational salience in the VLT. Asterisk indicates the optimal choice for each pair. 
There is no optimal selection for the control condition. 
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Figure IV-2 Diagram of the Source Recognition Task (SRT). 
The task included 6 scenes from the VLTs and 12 new scenes. Participants were given 6 choices and no 
feedback was given. 
 
 
Results 
All analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS version 24. For analyses including within-
subject factors, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied when sphericity was violated, 
and corrected degrees of freedom (rounded to the nearest integer for easier reading), p, and F 
values are reported below. Effect sizes for repeated measures were determined using partial eta 
squared. Effect sizes for post hoc t tests were calculated as indicated by Rosenthal (1991). 
Effects of .10 are considered small, effects of .30 are considered moderate, and effects of .50 are 
considered large. 
Point Incentive vs. Monetary Incentive 
In general, participants in the point incentive condition performed similarly to those in 
the monetary incentive condition.  Neither the main effect nor any interactions involving the 
incentive type reached statistical significance for performance in the VLT or SRT. Only one 
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exception was found in attribution errors for new scenes.  Details and statistics on these effects 
are discussed in corresponding result sections. 
   As mentioned earlier in the method section, the number of participants excluded for 
not learning to criterion was larger for the point incentive condition (N = 7) compared to the 
monetary incentive condition (N = 17). To further test the relationship between incentive type 
and exclusion, a chi-squared test was run. The association between incentive type and exclusion 
was marginally significant, Χ2(2) = 3.33, p = 0.07, suggesting that monetary incentives have 
some beneficial effect on overall performance that leads to more participants meeting the 
learning criteria.  However, as the subsequent analyses reveal, incentive type does not affect the 
patterns of learning.  
Value Learning  
We first examined the effects of incentive type, valence, and block on participant’s 
performance accuracy (percent correct). In the VLT, participants chose scenes from pairs to 
maximize gains and minimize loss. We defined an accurate response as selecting the optimal 
image (80% win, 20% loss), regardless of its actual outcome. For each participant, we calculated 
the proportion of trials within each block for which they selected the optimal image in each 
valence condition. These choice scores served as an index of learning over blocks and incentive 
condition.  
The critical results are illustrated in Figure 3, which illustrates better learning of win than 
loss trials over blocks, and similarly for the two incentive conditions. These effects were 
confirmed quantitatively using a mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with choice performance 
accuracy as the dependent measure and incentive type (Point Incentive, Monetary Incentive), 
valence (Win, Loss), and block (1,2,3,4,5) as independent variables. Results revealed a 
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significant main effect of valence, F(1, 90) = 58.06, p < .001, 2p = .393, indicating that overall 
participants were more likely to select the optimal image in the win than loss condition. The 
main effect of block was also significant, F(4, 239) = 100.91, p < .001, 2p = .529. The likelihood 
that participants’ would select the optimal scene increased over blocks, M = 
.71<.85<.90<.93<.94 (See Table 1 for value learning performance for each block in all 
conditions). The main effect of incentive type was not significant, F(1,90) =1.33, p = .252, 2p = 
.015. Participants in both incentive type conditions performed similarly, and there were no 
interactions with this variable, F < 1.33, p > .525,  2p  < .015. The interaction between valence 
and block just reached significant level, F(3, 90) = 2.76, p =.049, 2p  = .030. Post hoc paired 
samples t tests showed that win associations were learned significantly better in each block, t > 
3.54, p < .001. The marginal status of this interaction is likely due to the near ceiling 
performance in the last two blocks of the win condition contributing to numerically smaller mean 
differences between win and loss. 
For the no-change pair, neither scene is an optimal choice. Therefore, for each 
counterbalance order, one no-change scene was arbitrarily selected as the correct scene. 
Probability of the selecting the scene was examined by a repeated-measures ANOVA as a 
function of incentive type (Point Incentive, Monetary Incentive) and block (1,2,3,4,5). No effects 
were statistically significant, all F < 3.03. The average of choosing an arbitrarily selected scene 
in the pair was .51 across all participants.  
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Figure IV-3 Value learning performance 
Mean value learning accuracy (percent correct ± standard error) as a function of incentive type, valence, 
and block. The graph represents the average probability of choosing the optimal choice over 5 blocks for 
win, loss, and control (no-change) pairs. Error bars indicate standard errors.  
 
Table IV-1 Percent correct means and standard errors (SE) for value learning performance. 
 
  Blocks 
  Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 
Performance  Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Point Incentive 
 
Win .74 (.04) .91 (.03) .93 (.03) .95 (.02) .96 (.01) 
Loss .67 (.02) .76 (.03) .86 (.02) .88 (.02) .90 (.01) 
Control .47 (.04) .48 (.05) .45 (.05) .44 (.05) .45 (.05) 
Monetary Incentive 
 
Win .77 (.03) .92 (.03) .96 (.02) .98 (.02) .99 (.00) 
Loss .66 (.02) .81 (.02) .84 (.03) .91 (.01) .92 (.01) 
Control .54 (.04) .59 (.05) .56 (.05) .58 (.06) .56 (.05) 
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Source Recognition 
The SRT evaluated participants’ explicit knowledge of the associations learned in the 
VLT. In a forced choice recognition task, participants indicated their knowledge of the prior 
outcome associated with each image from the VLT as well as novel images that had not appeared 
in that task.   
We first examine participants’ general ability to distinguish between old and new scenes.  
The criteria for correctly classifying an old scene is to choose any category except for new in the 
source recognition task (note that participants can correctly identify an old scene but still make a 
mistake in terms of the scene identity). We performed a mixed ANOVA on scene recognition as 
a function of incentive type (Point Incentive, Monetary Incentive), and scene type (Old, New). 
Participants showed similar recognition accuracy for new (M = .94, SE = .01) and old scenes (M 
= .95, SE = .008), F < 1 and performance between point incentive and monetary incentive group 
did not differ, F (1, 90) = 1.99, p = .162, 2p = .022. 
  A mixed ANOVA compared recognition accuracy as a function of incentive type 
(Point Incentive, Monetary Incentive), valence (Win, Loss), and motivational salience (High, 
Low). The main effect of incentive was not significant, F < 1, nor were any of its interactions, all 
Fs < 1. Therefore, the key results illustrated in Figure 4 collapse across the two incentive 
conditions. Results revealed a significant main effect of motivational salience, F(1, 90) = 109.16, 
p < .001, 2p = .548, indicating better memory for high motivational salience scenes than low 
motivational salience scenes. Although the main effect of valence was not significant, F <1, the 
interaction between motivational salience and valence was significant, F(1, 90) = 142.13, p < 
.001, 2p = .612. Follow-up paired samples t tests revealed that participants’ source recognition 
was significantly better for the high salience scene than the low salience scene in the win pair, 
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t(91) = 19.48, p < .001, r = .80. By contrast, participants’ classification accuracy was better for 
the low motivational salience scene than the high motivational salience scene in the loss pair, but 
this effect did not survive Bonferroni correction, t(91) = 2.18, p = .032, r = .14. When comparing 
the source memory for the two optimal choices, participants’ source recognition was 
significantly better for the high motivational salience win scene than the low salience loss scene, 
t(91) = 6.76, p < .001, r = .42.  Therefore, recognition was better for scenes that had previously 
been optimal choices, although this effect was considerably more pronounced for win than for 
loss scenes.  
Participants were also better able to identify the high salience win scene than the no-
change scenes, t(91) = 6.26, p < .001, r = .39. Yet, follow-up Bonferroni corrected comparisons 
showed that recognition accuracy for no-change scenes was significantly better than for the low 
salience win scene, as well as high salience loss scenes, t(91) = 13.82, p < .001, r = .65; and t(91) 
= 4.27, p < .001, r = .28. The recognition accuracy for no-change scenes was numerically better 
than low salience loss scene, but the difference didn’t survive after Bonferroni correction, t(91) = 
2.14, p = .035, r = .13. 
  
 134
 
Figure IV-4 Source recognition accuracy. 
Mean recognition accuracy (percent correct ± standard error) as a function of valence, and motivational 
salience collapsing across incentive conditions. The graph depicts average recognition accuracy for each 
scene. Error bars indicate standard errors. 
 
Attribution Errors 
Win and Loss Scenes Misattribution 
The SRT data suggest that regardless of incentive condition, participants acquire different 
information about win and loss pairs. To gain more insight into what information participants 
acquire about these pairs, we examined attribution errors.  Valenced scenes could be associated 
with four different types of errors: Salience Error (i.e. a participant misattributed a low salience 
scene for a high salience scene or vice versa), Valence Error (i.e. a participant misattributed a 
loss scene as a win scene, or vice versa), No Change Error (i.e. a participant misattributed a 
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loss/win scene as a no change scene), New Error (i.e. a participant misattributed a win/loss scene 
as a new scene). Two questions are especially relevant: 1) What types of errors did participant 
make for low salience win scenes, where recognition accuracy was lowest?  2) What types of 
errors did participant make for the two loss scenes both of which were associated with accuracy 
levels less than 70%?  As Figure 5 illustrates, no change errors were most prominent for low 
salience win scenes, which makes sense because this was the outcome associated with this scene 
80% of the time, yet also suggests poor recognition of the scene’s valence. For low salience loss 
scenes, participants made relatively fewer errors and no change errors were also most common. 
For the high salience loss scenes, however, salience errors are most prominent, suggesting that 
valence but not salience was encoded for loss outcome in contrast to the high salience, win 
outcome, where valence and salience were accurately recognized. 
In order to examine these effects quantitatively, a mixed ANOVA was conducted on 
recognition errors with the between-subject factor of incentive type (Point Incentive, Monetary 
Incentive), and the within-subject factors valence (Win, Loss), salience (High, Low), and error 
type (Salience, Valence, No Change, New).  Here we focus on the effects related to error type for 
two reasons (See supplemental table 1 for full details of the ANOVA). First, some effects from 
the misattribution analyses are redundant with recognition accuracy analyses. For example, there 
was a significant interaction between valence and motivational salience on recognition errors, 
F(1, 90) = 122.40, p < .001, 2p = .576. Participants made fewer errors in optimal choices from the 
value learning task. The recognition accuracy results indicate that participants were more likely 
to identify the optimal scene accurately. Second, due to the number of factors, this ANOVA 
resulted in many main effects and interactions. A more focused analysis allows us to address our 
two research questions. Results revealed that the valence x motivational salience x error types 
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interaction was significant, F(1, 166) = 8.46, p < .001, 2p = .086, indicating that participants 
made different patterns of errors for each the four valenced scenes. For the low salience win 
scene, a follow-up ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of error type, F(2, 164) = 41.69, p 
< .001, 2p = .314, indicating the most common misattribution was no change (M = .47, SE = .05).  
Similarly, the low salience loss scenes were also mistaken as no change scenes (M = .20, SE = 
.04), F(2, 174) = 13.01, p < .001, 2p = .125. However, the high salience loss scene was most 
likely mistaken for a low salience loss scene (M = .32, SE = .04), F(2, 153) = 28.93, p < .001, 2p 
= .241. Thus the statistical indices support the key effects evident in Figure 5, and confirm that 
the low salience scenes for both valences were typically mistaken for no-change scenes; however 
high salience loss scenes were encoded accurately for valence but not for salience.  
 
 
Figure IV-5 Mean recognition error rate. 
Mean recognition error rate (percent error ± standard error) as a function of valence, motivational 
salience, and error type. The bars represent the average misattribution errors by scene type. Error bars 
indicate standard errors. 
Misattribution of No-Change Scenes  
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To examine the attribution errors for the no change scenes, a mixed ANOVA was 
performed as a function of incentive type (Point Incentive, Monetary Incentive) and error type 
(Low Salience Win, High Salience Win, Low Salience Loss, high salience loss, New). The main 
effect of error type was significant, F(3, 243) = 10.24, p < .001, 2p = .102.  Participants were 
most likely to misidentify a no change scene as a low salience loss scene (M = .12, SE = .02), 
followed by high salience loss scene (M = .06, SE = .01), new scene (M = .04, SE = .01), low 
salience win scene (M = .02, SE = .01), and high salience win scene (M = .01, SE = .01).  No 
other effects were statistically significant, all F < 2.83, p > .10. 
 
Misattribution of New Scenes  
As indicated in the Source Recognition section, participants in general had no difficulty 
distinguishing the new scenes (M = .94, SE = .01) from the old scenes (M = .95, SE = .008), so 
errors were rare. To examine the attribution errors for the new scenes, a mixed ANOVA was 
performed as a function of incentive type (Point Incentive, Monetary Incentive) and error type 
(Low Salience Win, High Salience Win, Low Salience Loss, high salience loss, New). The main 
effect of error type was significant, F(1, 130) = 13.50, p < .001, 2p = .130.  Participants were 
most likely to misidentify a new scene as a no change scene (M = .04, SE = .09), followed by 
low salience loss scene (M = .006, SE = .003) and high salience loss scene (M = .006, SE = .002), 
low salience win scene (M = .005, SE = .01), and high salience win scene (M = .01, SE = .01).  
The interaction between incentive type and error type was also significant, F(1, 130) = 4.96, p < 
.05, 2p = .052. Participants who received points were most likely to misidentify a new scene as a 
no change scene (M = .06, SE = .01) compared to other scenes, F(1, 49) = 12.86, p < .01, 2p = 
.222. By contrast, participants who received monetary incentive showed similar error rates across 
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different error types, F(1, 63) = 2.06, p = .149, 2p = .044. Numerically, participants in monetary 
incentive group were most likely to misidentify a new scene as a no change scene (M = .02, SE = 
.01) compared to other scenes.  
 
Equal vs. Unequal Learners  
 The differences in source recognition for win and loss scenes may reflect differences in 
the strengths of the associations learned to win outcomes relative to loss outcomes. That is, the 
learning advantage for win scenes may have led to more accurate explicit knowledge of the 
outcome associated of the optimal win scene (i.e., high salience win scenes) compared to the 
optimal loss scene (i.e., low salience loss scenes).  If differential learning levels is the basis for 
differences in recognition performance, then people who performed equally well in the win and 
loss conditions should not show different patterns of source recognition memory.  To test this 
hypothesis, we performed a median split separating participants in groups with low and high 
win-loss learning differences.  
 We first calculated the overall learning differences between the win and loss conditions 
by subtracting the probability of choosing the optimal choice averaged over 5 blocks for the loss 
condition from the average for the win condition.  Then we determined the median for this 
difference to be 0.085.  Participants with scores lower or equal to the median of the the win-loss 
learning difference, either learned loss better than win or they learned win and loss outcomes 
approximately equally well. This group is called equal learners because very few participants 
learned loss better than win (only 6 of 46 participants learned loss 5% or greater better than win). 
Participants who had their win-loss learning difference higher than the median learned win better 
than loss, and they are referred to as unequal learners.  
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Value Learning 
The learning curves for equal and unequal learners are displayed in Figure 6, which 
shows clearly that equal learners achieved approximately equivalent levels of performance for 
win and loss scenes across all 5 block, whereas unequal learners consistently performed worse 
for loss than win scenes.  To characterize the effects of this median split quantitatively, the 
choice scores on the VLT were analyzed in a mixed ANOVA with the between-subject factors 
learner type (Equal, Unequal) and incentive type (Point Incentive, Monetary Incentive), and the 
within-subject factors valence (Win, Loss), and block (1,2,3,4,5). Results of the effects of 
incentive type, valence, and block followed the same pattern as the original ANOVA (See 
supplemental table 2 for details). None of the effects involving incentive condition reached 
statistical significance. Although the effect of learner type was not significant, F < 1, the 
interaction between valence and learner type was significant, F(1, 88) = 97.45, p < .001, 2p = 
.525. Follow-up paired sample t tests demonstrated that this interaction resulted from 
significantly better value learning performance for win than loss outcomes in unequal learners, 
t(45) = 19.39, p < .001, r = .79, in contrast with approximately equivalent performance for win 
and loss learning performance in equal learners, t(45) = .699, p =  .488, r = .04. Moreover, the 
three-way interaction learner type x valence x block was significant, F(3, 235) = 5.59, p < .01, 2p 
= .060.  A follow-up repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that the interaction between valence 
and block was significant for unequal learners, F(2, 112) = 7.25, p < .001, 2p = .139, but not for 
equal learners, F(3, 127) = 1.05, p = .369, 2p = .023. Paired sample t-tests revealed that unequal 
learners acquired win outcomes better than loss outcomes in every block, all t > 6.72, all p < 
.001, all r > .53. By contrast, equal learners acquired win and loss outcomes similarly for the first 
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four blocks, all t < 1.4, p > .15, however for block 5 win outcomes were better learned than loss 
outcomes, t(45) = 2.34, p < .05, r = .19.  
 
 
Figure IV-6 Value learning performance for equal and unequal learners. 
Mean value learning accuracy (percent correct ± standard error) as a function of learner type, valence, and 
block. The graph represents the average probability of choosing the optimal scene over 5 blocks for win, 
loss, and no-change pairs. Error bars indicate standard errors. 
 
Source Recognition 
Figure 7 illustrates the critical results.  For both learner types, performance was the best 
when identifying high salience win scenes and the worst for the low salience win scenes. 
Identification of the no-change scenes was also similar for both learner type.  Critically, both 
groups identified optimal win scenes more accurately than optimal loss scenes.  This was true 
even for equal learners, whose choice performance indicates approximately equivalent 
knowledge of which scene to select when presented with a win or a loss pair.  Nevertheless, 
equal learners were no better at identifying the low salience loss scene than unequal learners, and 
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were actually worse at distinguishing low from salience loss scenes than the unequal learners.  
That is, while equal learners had similar identification accuracy for high and low salience loss 
scenes, unequal learners identified high salience loss scenes less accurately compared to low 
salience loss scenes. Together, these results suggest that regardless of whether win and loss 
associations were learned equally well, the motivational salience attribution was different 
between win and loss scenes. Therefore, learning level alone cannot explain the valence-based 
difference in source recognition performance.   
These effects were confirmed quantitatively using a mixed ANOVA on recognition 
accuracy as a function of learner type (Equal, Unequal), incentive condition (Point Incentive, 
Monetary Incentive), valence (Win, Loss), and motivational salience (High, Low). Results on the 
effects of incentive condition, valence, and motivational salience followed the same pattern as 
the earlier ANOVA (See supplemental table 3 for details). Although the main effect of learner 
type was not significant, F <1, there was a significant interaction between learner type and 
incentive condition, F(1, 88) = 6.93, p = .01, 2p = .073. Equal learners who received monetary 
incentives performed better than those who received points (Money: M = .67, SE = .05; Point: M 
= .51, SE = .06), t(44) = 2.21, p < .05, r = .31. For unequal learners, the pairwise comparison 
between Monetary Incentive and Point Incentive was not significant (Money: M = .51, SE = .04; 
Point: M = .59, SE = .03), t(44) = 1.44, p = .157, r = .21.  The three-way interaction learner type 
x valence x motivational salience was also significant, F(1, 88) = 7.61, p < .01, 2p = .080. While 
unequal learners showed better recognition for scenes that had previously been optimal choices 
(i.e. the high salience win scene and the low salience loss scene, t(45) = 19.86, p < .001, r = .89, 
and t(45) = 2.92, p < .01, r = .30, respectively), equal learners better identified high salience win 
scenes, t(45) = 10.65, p < .001, r = .71, but showed approximately equivalent performance for 
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the loss scenes, t(45) = .21, p = .833, r = .02. For both equal and unequal learners, source 
recognition was significantly better for high salience win scene compared to low salience loss 
scene, t(45) = 4.67, p < .001, r = .40, and t(45) = 4.87, p < .001, r = .44, respectively. 
  Performance for no-change scenes followed the general pattern reported across 
both groups, except that unequal learner identified no-change and low salience loss scenes 
equally well (See supplemental table 4 for details).  
 
Figure IV-7 Source recognition accuracy for equal and unequal learners. 
Mean recognition accuracy (percent correct ± standard error) as a function of learner type, valence, and 
motivational salience. The graph depicts the average recognition accuracy for each scene type. Error bars 
indicate standard errors. 
 
Discussion 
Win Associations Are Learned Better Than Loss Associations 
 We used a value learning task to imbue scenes with different valences and different 
levels of motivational salience. Through performing the VLT across a series of 300 trials, 
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participants learned associations with a high or low probability win or loss for each of 6 
different scenes. We were surprised to find that action-outcome associations for win 
associations were learned significantly better overall than for loss associations. This result was 
unexpected because learning differences did not figure prominently in prior reports with the 
VLT.  Moreover, the computation of prediction errors (PEs) should be the same for both win 
and loss condition. PEs only concern the differences between expected outcome and actual 
outcome, regardless of valence. A positive PE represents an actual outcome better than 
expected, while a negative PE codes an actual outcome worse than expected. The VLT structure 
manipulates the expected values (-.8x, -.2x, .2x, .8x, where x is the performance score value 
involved) to be symmetrical between win and loss condition. 
 Prompted by these results, a closer examination of prior studies using a VLT similar to 
the one used here, we found trends towards a similar learning asymmetry: win associations 
tended to better learned than loss associations (e.g. Chapman, Gallivan, & Enns, 2015; 
Pessiglione et al., 2006; Rothkirch et al., 2017; Rutherford, O’Brien, & Raymond, 2010). For 
some of the studies that did not find statistical significant effect or did not report the statistics in 
the VLT, the numerical pattern is consistent with that reported here (e.g. Painter, Kritikos, & 
Raymond, 2013; Raymond & O’Brien, 2009).   
 There are at least two potential explanations for this learning difference between win and 
loss, and they may not be mutually exclusive. First, it may be the product of the task structure. 
In other words, although the task structure appears to be symmetrical between win and loss 
condition, the cumulative values over time may be different for win and loss condition. The 
optimal choices are the high salience win and low salience loss. Participants might learn faster 
for win optimal choice because the high probability associated with it is more likely to provide 
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useful feedback (win) to update the representation. For the loss pair, choosing the low 
probability associated stimuli often leads to no change outcome (80% of the time) and thus 
participants might take longer to update the representation of action-outcome contingency. The 
second possible explanation for the difference is that there actually are two different 
mechanisms for learning win and loss associations that operate on different time scales, such 
that learning win outcome associations is more efficient.  Finding that gains and losses may be 
mediated by different neural pathways from several neuroimaging studies might lend some 
support for this claim (e.g., Knutson et al., 2001; Matthews et. al., 2004; Yacubian et. al., 2006).  
 This finding that win associations are learned better than loss, is important because it 
affects the findings as well as interpretations of the secondary tasks often included in studies of 
value learning. Given that multiple research groups have adopted a similar approach to study 
value learning, it is important for future studies to clarify and investigate this win-loss difference. 
 
Source Recognition and Attribution Errors 
 After completing the VLT, participants performed the SRT to assess their explicit 
knowledge of the association learned for each image, and to distinguish them from novel 
images. We found several interesting findings. First, source recognition was significantly better 
for the high salience scene than the low salience scene in the win pair, while source recognition 
tended to be better for the low salience scene than the high salience scene in the loss pair. Thus, 
source recognition was superior for scenes that had previously been the optimal choice. The 
source recognition pattern matched with the selection history in the VLT.  Critically, this effect 
was significantly more pronounced for win than for loss scenes. Second, the source recognition 
for low salience win scenes was the worst among all scenes. Participants were most likely to 
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make a no-change error, indicating that there was relative insensitivity to the win outcome if 
they were rare. Third, similar to the low salience win scene, no-change errors are most common 
for low salience loss scenes, however for low salience scenes participants were more sensitive to 
loss than to wins.  For high salience scenes the opposite appears to be true, except that 
participants when they erred in recognizing high salience loss scenes, they misidentified the 
scene as a low salience loss scene, indicating that valence had indeed been encoded.   
 Given the superior performance for the win relative to the loss condition in the VLT, we 
conducted a median split to compare source recognition of participants who had learned 
associations with win and loss outcomes relatively equally well to those who learned win 
associations better than loss. Both groups showed the same recognition performance for the win 
scenes, with the best recognition of high salience win scenes.  For both groups, these scenes 
were recognized better than either type of loss scene, even for equal learners.  The only 
difference in source recognition was the relative performance on high and low salience loss 
scenes:  Equal learners, recognized these equally well; unequal learners, recognized low 
salience loss scenes better than high salience loss scene.  These results indicate that the highly 
accurate identification of the optimal (high salience) win scenes relative to optimal (low 
salience) loss scenes does not depend on learning level.  Even participants who learned win and 
loss associations equally well showed a striking asymmetry in the identification accuracy 
(source recognition) for optimal win and loss scenes:  the valence of loss was recognized, but 
salience information for losses was relatively impoverished.  This was true for both equal and 
unequal learners despite group differences in recognition levels for high and low salience loss 
scenes. These results suggest a previously unreported dissociation between value based choice 
performance and explicit knowledge of the outcome contingencies, especially for loss and low 
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probability outcomes. Furthermore, motivational salience is represented differentially in explicit 
memory for win and loss outcomes. 
 To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the explicit knowledge of learned 
value associations. Source recognition and attribution errors are integral parts of participants’ 
explicit knowledge of the learned action-outcome associations and should be discussed together.  
The attribution error findings showed that while low salience scenes for win and loss were 
typically mistaken for no-change scenes, high salience loss scenes were encoded accurately for 
valence but not for salience because they were most likely mistaken for a low salience loss 
scene. The error patterns in win and loss seem to be consistent with the strategy win-stay, lose-
shift such that participants are more likely to stay with the high probability win while they are 
more exploratory following a high probability loss (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993). The fact that no-
change scenes were most likely mistaken for loss scenes seems to also support this 
interpretation. Compared to loss outcome associations, win outcome associations seemed to be 
acquired more efficiently, suggesting that win and loss learning may operate on different time 
scales.    
 Our findings are also consistent with neuroimaging studies that motivational salience 
and valence may be mediated by different neural networks and interact differentially in the 
representation of action-outcome associations (Anderson et al., 2003; Cooper & Knutson, 2008; 
Jensen et al., 2007; Litt et al., 2010; Small et al.,2003). In addition, studies found that striatum 
activated for both valence and salience signals (Cooper & Knutson, 2008; Litt et al., 2010). This 
suggests that striatum may be the common area where representations are updated and 
implemented.    
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Monetary Incentives Did Not Affect Patterns of Value Learning or Source Recognition 
 We did not find performance differences between the point incentive group and the 
monetary incentive group. Participants showed a similar level of value learning and source 
recognition performance. For attribution errors, we found that the error pattern for new scenes 
was different between point incentive and monetary incentive participants. Participants who 
received monetary incentives made similar levels of errors across different error types while 
participants who received points misidentified new scenes as no change scenes more frequently 
compared to other error types. However, it is important to note that participants made the fewest 
errors in new scenes compared to other types of scenes. Moreover, participants in the two 
incentive groups did not differ in the number of errors they made.  Therefore, we interpret this 
effect as a chance finding.  
 We also found that more participants had to be excluded from the point incentive than 
monetary incentive group, but this pattern was not statistically significant. The results of 
monetary incentive were consistent predictions from neuroscientific findings (Haber & Knutson, 
2010; Daniel & Pollmann,2010). If monetary incentives and performance-contingent feedback 
share the same neural mechanism in reward circuitry, receiving monetary incentives in addition 
to performance performance-contingent feedback may not improve performance. Performance-
contingent feedback may serve as the reward to update participants’ representation of action-
outcome associations. Therefore, monetary incentives do not improve value learning or source 
recognition, but it might help to motivate participants to reach performance criteria. The similar 
results from point and monetary incentive group from our study suggest that using performance-
based feedback, points in our study, can be generalizable to a more real-world situation.  
 148
Limitations and Future Directions 
 In the current study, a median split was conducted to investigate whether source 
recognition was influenced by the value learning difference between win and loss condition. 
The common concern in conducting median splits is a reduction of power and an increase in the 
potential for errors (Irwin & McClelland, 2003). However, Iacobucci and colleagues (2015) 
conducted a simulation study showing that the use of a median split is as good as a continuous 
variable when the primary interest is to investigate group differences free of multicollinearity. A 
more important concern for the current study is that the median split resulted in the loss of 
information about individual variability. For example, participants who performed higher than 
the median were classified in the “unequal learner” group regardless if they were only slightly 
above the median or much higher. Based on our findings, we cannot determine whether the 
learning pattern differences between equal and unequal learners were due to their experience 
during the task or group differences in terms of learning mechanisms. Future studies can address 
this issues by testing whether the learning patterns are stable across different experimental 
sessions. This would help to clarify whether these learning patterns are more state-like 
experience-driven or more trait-like individual differences. 
 To better explain the superior value learning for win outcomes relative to loss outcomes, 
we plan to use a computational learning theory, specifically reinforcement learning, to build 
computational models of the value learning task. The computational model can provide precise 
accounts of trial-by-trial performance, which is much more challenging in empirical studies. 
This theory can be used to provide not only interesting explanations of qualitative phenomena in 
aggregate, but also insights into the nature of individual differences. 
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Appendix  C.  
Table IV-2  Summary of ANOVA results for attribution errors analysis.   
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2p   
Incentive Type .039 1 .855 .358 .009 
Error 4.16 90    
Valence .003 1 .101 .751 .001 
V x I .045 1 1.48 .227 .016 
Error (Valence) 2.73 90    
Motivational 
Salience 
1.62 1 75.27** < .001 .455 
M x I .018 1 .828 .365 .009 
Error (MS) 1.94 90    
Error Type 5.13 2 31.37** < .001 .258 
ET x I .039 2 .237 .833  .003 
Error (ET) 14.72 222    
V x MS 3.41 1 122.40** < .001 .576 
V x MS x I  .003 1 .110 741 .001 
Error (V x MS) 2.51 90    
V x ET 3.34 2 19.98** < .001 .182 
V x ET x I .099 2 .590 .584 .007 
Error (V x ET) 15.05 214    
MS x ET 8.79 3 66.81** < .001 .426 
MS x ET x I .062 3 .468 .670 .005 
Error (MS x ET) 11.83 225    
V x MS x ET 1.36 2 8.46** <.001 .086 
V x MS x ET x I .235 2 1.46 .237 .016 
Error (V x MS x 
ET) 
14.52 166    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
 
Table IV-3 Summary of ANOVA results for learner type analysis on value learning performance.   
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2p   
Incentive Type .096 1 1.25 .266 .014 
Learner Type .05 1 .061 .805 .001 
I x L .56 1 .056 .396 .008 
Error 6.72 88    
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Valence 1.84 1 117.41** < .001 .572 
V x I .031 1 1.98 .163 .022 
V x L 1.53 1 97.45** < .001 .525 
V x I x L .021 1 1.33 .252 .015 
Error (Valence) 1.38 88    
Block 6.61 3 100.48** < .001 .533 
B x I .024 3 .36 .762 .004 
B x L .12 3 1.83 .149 .020 
B x I x L .16 3 2.49 
  
.067 .028 
Error (block) 5.79 238    
V x B .131 3 2.93* .040 .032 
V x B x I .059 3 1.32 .262  .015 
V x B x L .250 3 5.59** <.01 .060 
V x B x I x L .042 3 .938 .442 .011 
Error (V x B) 3.93 235    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
 
Table IV-4 Summary of ANOVA results for learner type analysis on source recognition performance.   
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p 2p   
Incentive Type .18 1 .906 .344 .010 
Learner Type .13 1 .679 .412 .008 
I x L 1.37 1 6.93* .010 .073 
Error 17.34 88    
Valence .020 1 .162  .688 .002 
V x I .058 1 .468 .496 .005 
V x L .005 1 .040 .843 .000 
V x I x L .098 1 .788 .377 .009 
Error (Valence) 10.89 88    
Motivational 
Salience 
9.37 1 106.93** < .001 .549 
MS x I .030 1 .343 .559 .004 
MS x L .003 1 .033 .856 .000 
MS x I x L .015 1 .174 
  
.678 .002 
Error (MS) 7.72 88    
V x MS 17.60 1 149.93** < .001 .630 
V x MS x I .001 1 .010 .920  .000 
V x MS x L .893 1 7.61** <.01 .080 
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V x MS x I x L .000 1 .002 .967 .000 
Error (V x MS) 3.93 235    
*p<.05, **p < .01 
 
Table IV-5 Summary of Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons for equal and unequal learners on 
source recognition performance. 
Learner type Comparison df t p r  
Equal  
Learner 
20%Win-No Change 45 8.04** < .001 .566 
80%Win-No Change 45 3.90** < .001 .329 
20%Loss-No Change 45 2.13 .039 .171 
80%Loss-No Change 45 2.13 .039 .195 
Unequal  
Learner 
20%Win-No Change 45 12.10** < .001 .745 
80%Win-No Change 45 4.96** < .001 .471 
20%Loss-No Change 45 .949 .348 .094 
80%Loss-No Change 45 3.90** < .001 .372 
**p < .01 
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Chapter V. General Discussion 
 
Most researchers on attention, have, at one time or another, succumbed to the temptation 
of beginning their presentation with the well-worn William James quote “Everyone knows what 
attention is…” and then devoting the rest of their talk to how attention turns out to be a much 
more complicated phenomenon than our intuition suggests.  Perhaps less well-known are his 
quotes on how motivation and value influence our attention and memory – issues which this 
dissertation demonstrates are at least equally as complex. 
  
It is our attitude at the beginning of a difficult task which, more than anything else, will affect its 
successful outcome.                                                                      — William James 
 Chapters II and III demonstrate the sometimes-paradoxical effects of incentive on 
attentional performance, examine which aspects of attention and cognitive control may be most 
sensitive to those manipulations, and take steps towards elucidating the cognitive-motivational 
states and traits that may mediate those effects.  Chapter II manipulated incentive between 
subjects and found that incentive tended to have no effect or a small beneficial effect on the 
focused attention of young adults and decreased their subjective reports of mind-wandering.  In 
contrast, older adults had worse performance and more mind-wandering under incentive, 
especially in the loss condition.  These deleterious effects were statistically eliminated by 
controlling for mind-wandering, suggesting that loss incentives may paradoxically decrease 
motivation and focus in older adults.  
 158
There are two potential explanations for the poor performance of the older adults in the 
loss condition. First, when faced with monetary losses related to performance, older adults might 
have disengaged with the negative situation and reduced their motivation and focus on the task. 
Alternatively, loss incentives might have amplified the results of making errors, and older adults 
became anxious and concerned about their own performance. In this case, the increased self-
reported mind-wandering might be to performance-related concerns.  In other words, concerns 
about their poor performance may actually have served as a form of distraction, further impairing 
performance in a “vicious circle”.   
Chapter III examined different dimensions of motivation and incentive –global context 
effects, more local run-by-run effects, and a person’s motivational tendencies.   
In addition to using the same task and between-subjects incentive manipulation in Chapter II, a 
within-subjects manipulation was added. For the incentivized conditions, experimental runs 
alternated between incentivized versus non-incentivized conditions. Monetary incentives reduced 
both young and older adults’ attentional performance compared to the situation when incentive 
was not offered at all. When incentives were offered, performance was worse in runs when 
incentives were absent. Additional results from self-report measures suggest that for young 
adults, incentives may be distracting and lead to worse performance. In contrast, older adults 
were more intrinsically motivated, and the external incentive bonus appeared to decrease their 
motivation. These results may raise more questions than they answer. However, they highlight 
potential factors that may not receive sufficient attention in the current literature about the 
incentive effects on attention and cognitive control, or about age-related differences in that 
regard. Most importantly, they indicate that the effects of incentive may be influenced by the 
incentive structure. In this experiment, although incentives have beneficial effects on 
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performance within subjects, they may have quite different, and perhaps even detrimental, effects 
between subjects. 
  
 
Together, these two experiments demonstrate the complex, multi-dimensional nature of 
attention-motivation interactions. Contrary to the general assumptions that monetary incentives 
increase motivation and improve performance, the effects of incentive are sometimes-
paradoxical, and are influenced by a variety of factors such as an individual’s age (young or 
older adults) and the type of incentive scheme (between and within subject manipulation). 
  
Selection is the very keel on which our mental ship is built. And in this case of memory its utility 
is obvious. If we remembered everything, we should on most occasions be as ill off as if we 
remembered nothing.                                                                    — William James 
This quote from James illustrates that the limits on our attention also lead to limits on 
your memory, and that we must make decisions – consciously or not – as to what we will learn 
and remember.  Finally, Chapter IV investigates outcome probability and valence influence 
learning as well as subsequent explicit memory. It seems intuitive that the value of information 
should influence which aspects are learned and remembered, but again the data reported here 
suggest that the situation is more nuanced than it may at first appear. The effects of positive or 
negative (wins or losses) incentive value are not merely “mirror images” of each other, and the 
salience (probability) of an outcome may have different effects in win and loss conditions.  
Results revealed superior learning of win associations compared to loss associations, suggesting 
an advantage for outcomes with a positive valence. Regardless of learning level or incentive 
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condition, source recognition was superior for scenes that had been chosen most frequently (high 
probability win and low probability loss) but more accurately for win than loss scenes. These 
findings indicate that learning to select the optimal choice is dissociable from explicit knowledge 
about the outcome contingencies, especially for loss and low probability outcomes. Moreover, 
motivational salience is represented differentially in explicit memory for win and loss outcomes.  
Of course, the three experiments reported here cannot fully elucidate the complexities of 
incentive and motivation effects on attention, learning, and memory, and in many cases raise 
more questions than they answer.  However, taken together, they demonstrate the complex 
effects of incentive structure, individual differences, and outcomes associated with stimuli.  In 
some cases, the results contradicted our initial hypotheses, to which one might apply a final 
William James quote, “Those thoughts are truth which guide us to beneficial interaction with 
sensible particulars as they occur, whether they copy these in advance or not.”   In short, the 
findings of this dissertation show that factors often “taken for granted” in many experiments of 
incentive effects on attention and memory may have more complex effects than currently 
realized, and that these may impact the degree to which the results of those experiments translate 
to everyday life.  We do indeed hope that these questions will motivate further research, and that 
the results will have value for improving the real-world performance and well-being of both 
younger and older adults. 
 
 
 
 
 
